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MLAT JIU-JITSU AND TOR: MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
TREATIES IN SURVEILLANCE
Sarah Cortes
Cite as: Sarah Cortes, MLATJiu-Jitsu and Tor: Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties in Surveillance, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2015),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v22il/article2.pdf.
I. INTRODUCTION: RISE OF SURVEILLANCE, MLATs, ANONYMITY,
MJATs
[1]
A corrupt Australian Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) wishes to
track the communications of a journalist who has published leaked
whistleblowing documents from a confidential source, revealing the
Australian LEA's complicity in illegal narcotics activity. The target
journalist lives in New York and is a U.S. citizen. She opens her laptop,
goes online and fires up Tor Browser.' She is communicating with her
whistleblowing source in Australia, who faces death if his identity is
uncovered. Her communication and network traffic passes through Tor
relays in Canada, Finland, and Malaysia before arriving at her source in
Australia.2
[2]
In what we call an "MLAT cartel attack" against online privacy
tools, Australia uses treaty relationships with other countries to facilitate
surveillance. 3 The communication service providers (CSPs) under their
1See generally Tor Browser, TOR,
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en, archived at
https://perma.cc/FCM7-LMAC (last visited Dec. 2, 2015) (describing and explaining Tor
generally, in that it allows you to search the Internet without being tracked).
2 Tor

relays function to "receive traffic on the Tor network and pass it along." What Is
Tor?, TOR CHALLENGE, http://www.eff.org/torchallenge/what-is-tor.html, archivedat
http://perma.cc/6DKA-SY2B (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
3 See

Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive MetadataMachine: Liberty, Power, and Mass
Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 10 ISJLP 481, 483 (2014).
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jurisdiction all implemented automated surveillance through unclear legal
means. Once surveillance is automated and normalized, it becomes easier
to bypass Fourth Amendment protections,4 skipping meaningful judicial
oversight or a show of probable cause-asking forgiveness rather than
permission.
[3]
The corrupt Australia LEA presses the button, targeting the
journalist's network traffic,5 hoping to find her source. Traffic correlation6
and timing attacks7 enable the corrupt Australian LEA to capture the
journalist's outgoing message as it travels through the Tor network-and
she discovers the identity of her whistleblower in short order. It is the last
time the American journalist hears from her source-who has been
silenced.
[4]
Since Edward Snowden recommended the use of the Torflrowser
as one of his top tips for whistleblowers and ordinary people to protect
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.").
5

Actually, the IP address of the journalist's home router, to which her laptop is attached.

6 See, e.g., AARON JOHNSON, CHRIS WACEK, ROB JANSEN, MICAH SHERR & PAUL
SYVERSON, USERS GET ROUTED: TRAFFIC CORRELATION ON TOR BY REALISTIC
ADVERSARIES, at sec. 3 (20th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications

Security, Nov. 2013) [hereinafter CCS 2013],

http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/sites/www.nrl.navy.mil.itd.chacs/files/pdfs/13-12312077.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/V93X-5XW5 (describing how Tor and traffic
correlation attacks can work together).
7See, e.g., RISHAB

&

NITHYANAND, OLEKSII STAROV, ADVA ZAIR, PHILLIPA GILL
MICHAEL SCHAPIRA, MEASURING AND MITIGATING AS-LEVEL ADVERSARIES AGAINST

TOR 1, 14 (Aug. 18, 2015), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1505.05173.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/55MK-Q94T (asserting that there are high rates of susceptibility to traffic
correlation and timing attacks for Tor users, correlating to potentially high probability of
successful capture).
2

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXII, Issue I

their privacy and anonymity online, 8 policymakers are becoming aware of
Tor's role in protecting identity online. For instance, Snowden leaked a
document revealing the NSA project "EgotisticalGiraffe", which had the
objective of breaking underlying Tor encryption and privacy protections. 9
In this paper, we document how MLATs can assist in such attacks on Tor.
[5]
The documents released by Snowden reveal far greater levels of
U.S. and other government surveillance than previously known, 10
including surveillance outside the US and across multiple country
borders. " This widespread surveillance includes online data and
See Brian Fitzgerald, Snowden at SXSW: Encryption Must Be Stronger, DIGITS: WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/03/10/live-videoedward-snowden-at-sxsw/, archived at http://perma.cc/K9V4-KZQK (citing a Twitter
post by an individual attending the conference).
9 See Peeling Back the Layers of Tor with Egotistical Giraffe, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4,

2013, 10:49 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotisticalgiraffe-nsa-tor-document, archivedat http://perma.cc/ZE6B-S6YF; see also James Ball,
Bruce Schneier, & Glenn Greenwald, NSA and GCHQ Target Tor Network That Protects
Anonymity of Web Users, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 10:50 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption,
archived at http://perma.cc/CA5Q-4F56; Barton Gellman, Craig Timberg, & Steven
Rich, Secret NSA Documents Show CampaignAgainst Tor Encrypted Network, WASH.
POST (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-ca
mpaign-against-tor-encrypted-net
work/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-alf23cdal35e_story.html, archivedat
http://perma.cc/VM4M-ADY3.
See Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden: The
Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013,
9:00 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-sur
veillance, archived at http://perma.cc/K2ZC-Z94B.
10

11 See Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, Michael Sontheimer, & Holger Stark, A
Two-Faced Friendship:Turkey Is 'Partnerand Target'for the NSA, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INT'L (Aug. 31, 2014, 12:00 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partn
er-turkey-a-9890 11 .html, archivedat http://perma.cc/8VRA-P3TX.
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telecommunications; much of it culled from third-party communication
service providers ("C SPs"). 12 With the expansion of surveillance came the
expansion of U.S. law legalizing surveillance, such as the U.S. Patriot
Act.13 Some contend that much of this surveillance-often referred to by
LEAs as lawful intercept ("LI")-is actually unlawful.14
[6]
These changes in government surveillance have resulted in several
undesirable circumstances, including government attempts to apply
pressure directly on third-party CSPs operating within their borders.1 5
12

See id.

13 See U.S. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 201, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (2001);
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat.
4279, 4282 (1994).

See Steve Erlanger, Fighting Terrorism, French-Style, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/sunday-review/the-french-way-of-fighting-homegro
wn-terrorism.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7JJ2-BRU7; Scott M. Fulton, EU's
Reading to Cloud Providers:Stop Sheltering Yourselffrom US PatriotAct,
READWRITE.COM (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://readwrite.com/2011/12/page/eus-reding-to-cloud-providers, archivedat
http://perma.cc/HR9T-B4DA.
14

15 See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, FBI PressuresInternetProvidersto Install Surveillance
Software, CNET (Aug. 2, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-pressuresintemet-providers-to-install-surveillance-software/, archived at http://perma.cc/6WA83H39; Complaint at paras. 2, 7, 10, 13-14, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. C 08-04373
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2008), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/jewel/jewel.complaint.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/M7M4-PB2M. Jewel was one of the first to challenge the
NSA's massive domestic data collection program as "un" lawful interception. See NSA
Spying on Americans: Jewel v. NSA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOuND.,
https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel, archived at https://perma.cc/77CR-972V (last visited
Oct. 1, 2015). The NSA's defense has revolved around assertions under the state secrecy
privilege. Gov't Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to DIsmiss and for Summ. J. at 1, 7, Jewel
v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. C:08-cv-4373 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2009),
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/jewel/jewelgovreply.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/AZC8-5TXC. So far, the courts have declined to dismiss the case based
on state secrets. See, e.g., Order at 2, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. C 08-04373 (N.D.
Cal. July 8, 2013), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/jewelorder.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/E42U-A6Y7. On March 10, 2014, the court issued a temporary
4
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Coincident with the rise of online government surveillance has been a rise
in a little-noticed legal tool-the international Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MLAT).16 Governments control the CSPs, which own or operate
IT infrastructure over which network traffic passes. 17 MLATs provide
vector for government intelligence agencies (GIAs) to facilitate global
surveillance-technically and legally-through exploiting this control.
[7]
MLAT expansion facilitates surveillance and erodes civil liberties
in three distinct ways. First, specific MLAT provisions explicitly eliminate
existing civil liberties. Second, MLATs provide a legal framework for
mass cross-border surveillance. Third, MLATs technically facilitate
surveillance by controlling CSPs, encouraging technical surveillance
automation, and attacking online privacy and anonymity protecting tools.
We review recent MLAT circuit court rulings-including UnitedStates v.
Getto, decided by the Second Circuit on September 30, 2014.1

restraining order halting NSA's destruction of evidence. Order Granting TRO at 1-2,
Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. C 08-04373 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/03/11/089_order grantingtro3.10.14.pdf, archivedat
https://perma.cc/8GM4-CHDM. On June 5, 2014, EFF filed an application for an
emergency hearing upon learning that the NSA was continuing to destroy evidence.
Plaintiff's Emergency Appl. to Enforce the Court's TRO at 1-2, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec.
Agency, No. C:08-cv-4373 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/06/05/jewelemergencyapp enforce tro.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/NBP2-HVHJ.
16

For more information, see Sarah Cortes, Dynamic Triggering:MLA Ts, Third Parties

and ETSI TS 102 677Automated Surveillance (Sept. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript)

(on file with author) [hereinafter Dynamic Triggering].
17

id.

"s See generally United States v. Getto (Getto II) 586 Fed. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2014)
(finding Getto was guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud and
affirming his sentence).
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Figure 1. Tor usage over time. 19
[8]
As a result of expanded government surveillance and other trends,
such as the rise of Internet use generally and of marketing-oriented and
corporate surveillance-the use of online privacy and anonymity
protecting tools have risen.20 For global privacy, a class of online multi19 TorMetrics Direct Users by Country, TOR PROJECT,
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=userstats-relaycountry&start=2004-06-24&end=20 14-09-22&country=all&events=off, archived at
https://perma.cc/6TPV-73YT (last visited Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter TorMetrics];see
also Karsten Loesing, Steven J. Murdoch, & Roger Dingledine, A Case Study on
Measuring StatisticalData in the Tor Anonymity Network, FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY
AND DATA SECURITY 203, 210-11 (Radu Sion et al. eds., Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2010), http://sec.cs.ucl.ac.uk/users/smurdoch/papers/wecsrIOmeasuring.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/N5PW-QGP8.

20 Electronic Privacy Information Center lists 99 such tools, within the following 21

categories: (1) CD/USB Based Operating Systems; (2) Internet Anonymizers, Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs), and Proxy Servers; (3) Web Browser Ad-ons; (4) Search
Engines; (5) Email Encryption; (6) Alternative Email Accounts; (7) Anonymous
Remailers; (8) Disk/File Encryption; (9) Secure Instant Messaging; (10) Disk/File
Erasing Programs; (11) Password Vaults; (12) Firewalls; (13) Antivirus; (14)
Cookie/Cache/Internet History Cleaners; (15) Mobile Privacy; (16) VoIP/Video
Messaging; (17) Social Networking; (18) Meshnet; (19) Alternative Currencies; (20)
6
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jurisdictional anonymity/privacy tools (MJATs))-such as virtual private
networks (VPNs), proxy servers, and anonymous networks-have
emerged. 2Examples of these MJATs are JonDo, 12P, Freenet, 24
Lantern, 2 5 UltraSurf, 26 and Torflrowser.27 Since 2004, Torflrowser usage
has jumped to an average of over 2.5 million daily users worldwide,
peaking at over six million users on high-usage days.2 8
[9]

MJATs have many uses, and in one way can be thought of as

Publishing; and (21) Temporary Mobile Phones. See EPIC Online Guide to Practical
Privacy Tools, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/tools.html, archived at
https://perma.cc/U4MU-4J5Q (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
21

See id.

See JonDo - The IP Changer, JoNDONYM, https://anonymous-proxyservers.net/en/jondo.html, archivedat https://perma.cc/4BWJ-YV3 S (last visited Dec. 3,
2015) ("You may use JonDonym for anonymous surfing, anonymous e-mail, chats, and
other purposes.").
22

See What Does I2P Do for You?, INVISIBLE INTERNET PROJECT, https://geti2p.net/en,
archived at https://perma.cc/8Z28-2S76 (last visited Dec. 3, 2015) ("12P is an anonymous
overlay network. . .".).
23

See Share, Chat, Browse. Anonymously. On the Free Network., FREENET PROJECT,
https://freenetproject.org/index.html, archived at https://perma.cc/GD8T-HDLL (last
visited Oct. 4, 2015) ("Share files, chat on forums, browse and publish, anonymously and
without fear of blocking or censorship!").
24

See Open Internetfor Everyone, LANTERN, https://getlantem.org, archived at
https://perma.cc/7K8R-FJWK (last visited Oct. 4, 2015) ("Lantern is a free desktop
application that delivers fast, reliable, and secure access to the open Internet.").
25

See ULTRASURF, http://ultrasurf.us, archived at http://perma.cc/FKX4-7HJZ (last
visited Oct. 4, 2015) ("Ultrasurf has now become one of the world's most popular anticensorship, pro-privacy software.
.

26

27

See TorBrowser, supra note 1.

28

See TorMetrics, supra note 19.

7

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXII, Issue I

online counter-surveillance tools. In our opening hypothetical, the
American journalist and the Australian whistleblower used Tor to evade
government surveillance. Many use MJATs simply to evade corporate
marketing-driven surveillance. 29 Tor in particular is a source of
consternation for the NSA-as revealed by the leaked presentation entitled
"Tor stinks." 30 The NSA finds that Tor "stinks" because the NSA cannot
break its privacy and anonymity protecting encryption. 31 Like other
MJATs, Tor protects individual online privacy and anonymity against
government surveillance like the NSA's, or the corrupt Australian LEA's.
For this reason, MJATs like Tor are considered high-value targets.3 2 The
NSA slides portray the typical Tor user as a terrorist, providing them with
justification to attack privacy.3 3 However, a journalist is just as likely to
use anonymity to protect the identity of a whistleblower. Snowden's slides
reveal the effort and expense the GIAs invest in breaking Tor.3 4 MLATs
can uniquely facilitate breaking high-value targets like MJATs-while
providing a legal framework for doing so.
[10]
Government desire to extend surveillance, coupled with (1) a need
to provide a legal framework for otherwise unconstitutional acts
(including unlawful intercept and surveillance), (2) the need to pressure
CSPs into relaying surveillance information, and (3) the pursuit of MJAT
attacks, has led government agencies, LEAs, and others to seek to teach
29

See ULTRASURF, supra note 26.

30

CT SigDev, TOR STINKS, at 1 (June 2012), http://www.slideshare.net/jonbonachon/tor-

stinks, archivedat http://perma.cc/FJ5R-SADX; see also Ball, Schneier, & Greenwald,
supra note 9; 42 Years for Snowden Docs Release, Free All Now, CRYPTOME,
https://cryptome.org/2013/1 1/snowden-tally.htm, archivedat https://perma.cc/EU9AHJMK (last updated Aug. 15, 2015).
31

See CT SigDev, supra note 30, at 2.

32

See id. at 5.

33

See id. at 15.

34

See id. at 23; see also Ball, Schneier, & Greenwald, supra note 9.

8

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXII, Issue I

the old MLAT dog new tricks. In this category we demonstrate how
MLATs extend government control to foreign CSPs in a way that
facilitates a series of technical attacks on online privacy tools.
A. The Expansion of MLATs
[11]
We observe the correlation of MLAT expansion with the rise of
the Internet, cybercrime, and the expansion of lawful interception, or
government surveillance. We note that secret MLAT treaties possibly
further expand MLAT proliferation.
We observe that the rise in
government surveillance-along with the rise in corporate (or civil)
surveillance-has driven the proliferation of increasingly more
sophisticated online MJATs. Although LEAs form a significant class of
MJAT users,36 GIAs have created an endless cycle of government efforts
to attack MJATs and individuals' efforts to defend their privacy. MLATs
and MJATs are locked in this endless cycle of cyber arms proliferation.
[12]
We then review legal frameworks for intergovernmental legal
cooperation, including MLATs: how they work, how many are in force,
and which ones are most relevant, as well as frameworks for recognizing
and enumerating countries of the world. We demonstrate that recent
See Peter Vinthagen Simpson, Cold War Treaty Confirms Sweden Was Not Neutral,
LOCAL (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.thelocal.se/20131209/secret-cold-war-treatyconfirms-sweden-was-never-neutral, archivedat http://perma.cc/2RPV-PYMR
(regarding revelations following the proliferation of secret treaties); see, e.g., Pete Yost,
U.S. Cannot Say How Many Had Communications Watched, HUFFINGTON POST (July 28,
2011, 5:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110728/us-surveillancesecrecy/, archivedat http://perma.cc/N7CR-RYCM (regarding the proliferation of secret
legal activity).
35

THE

See arma, Talking to German Police in Stuttgart, TOR BLOG (Mar. 26, 2008),
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/talking-german-police-in-stuttgart, archived at
https://perma.cc/FVE2-NAZE; arna, Trip Report: Tor Trainingsfor the Dutch and
Belgian Police, TORBLOG (Feb. 5, 2013), https://blog.torproject.org/blog/trip-report-tortrainings-dutch-and-belgian-police, archivedat https://perma.cc/3BDZ-V76X; phobos, A
Visit to Iceland, TOR BLOG (May 22, 2011) https://blog.torproject.org/blog/visit-iceland,
archived at https://perma.cc/G2ZT-BDKP.
36

9
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growth in MLATs has been significantly motivated by a rise in GIA
surveillance. We show how the rise of GIA surveillance coincides with the
rise of MLATs. We review surveillance and non-surveillance related
reasons for the recent increase in MLATs-including a desire to control
and compel compliance, anti-bribery enforcement, the ubiquitous war on
drugs, and the availability to LEAs of third party corporate surveillance.
B. MLATs and Civil Liberties
[13]
First, through Internet-era improvements, which eliminate United
States constitutional and other legal protections, the power of MLATs has
quietly eroded civil liberties in numerous ways. For example,
commentators have pointed out defendants cannot use MLATs, 3 7 and that
MLATs expand unchecked online surveillance.3 8 MLATs give rise to
numerous civil liberties issues-including eliminating the double jeopardy
bar, and the death penalty bar.3 9 MLATs have expanded in scope to
40
include political crimes, and eliminate the dual criminality requirements.
MLAT enforcement has been presented as compulsory, and the executive
branch argues that the courts have no discretion in how the terms of the
MLAT are carried out.41 We note that MLAT surveillance and other
37 See Alastair Brown, Towards a Prosecutorial
Model for MutualAssistance in Criminal
Matters?, 6 HUME PAPERS ON PUB. POL'Y 50, 52, 56 (1998).

See Hearingon Law Enforcement Treaties:HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 108th Cong. 39-41(2004) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, President, Electronic
Privacy Information Center) [hereinafter Hearing].
38

39 See id. at 40; U.N OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, MANUAL ON MUTUAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE AND EXTRADITION 50-51 (2012),

https://www.unodc.org/documents/organizedcrime/Publications/MutualLegalAssistanceEbookE.pdf,
https://perma.cc/QY4G-XS3T.

archivedat

See Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, art. 11, June 3, 2002, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 107-18; Hearing, supra note 38, at 40.
40

Julian Ku & John Yoo, The Supreme CourtMisses Its Chance to Limit the Treaty
Power, FORBES (June 12, 2014, 4:00 AM),
41

10
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provisions ignore international law. Stepping back, we review the big
picture issues MLATs are increasingly raising in the courts: separation of
powers, judicial review, and constitutional supremacy. 42
[14]
As MLATs have been enforced-both by the United States in
foreign countries and United States MLAT partner countries in the United
States-court challenges have proliferated. These cases reflect a growing
schism between the executive branch and the courts; with the executive
branch asserting that the courts have no role in enforcing constitutional
provisions-and some circuit courts have begun to push back. More than
thirty years after the Supreme Court decided its last MLAT case-which
predated the Internet 4 3-an
increasing number of MILAT cases have
recently reached circuit courts. For example, in UnitedStates v. Getto the
Second Circuit affirmed a conviction after the District Court refused to
suppress evidence.44 The First, Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
issued contradictory rulings regarding MLATs, and numerous MLATrelated constitutional issues seem ripe for more thorough review by the
Supreme Court.4 5

http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/06/12/the-supreme-court-misses-its-chanceto-limit-the-treaty-power, archived at http://perma.cc/S5Z8-TPB3.
42 See Hearing, supra note 38, at 39.
43

See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667-70 (1992).
See United States v. Getto (Getto If), 586 Fed. App'x. 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2014).

See, e.g., United States v. Moloney (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States v. Global Fishing (In re 840 140th Ave. NE), 634 F.3d 557, 564 (9th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Hagege, 437
F.3d 943, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287, 1289-90
(11th Cir. 2003); Mercator Corp. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas), 318 F.3d
379, 381-82 (2d Cir. 2002).
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C. MLATs and Legal Frameworks for Global Mass
Surveillance
[15]
Second, by expanding their legal scope, MLATs have begun to
46
form a legal scaffolding for global surveillance. MLATs can accomplish
this either directly or indirectly. On the one hand, they expand scope to
explicitly include surveillance.
On the other, they create Joint
Investigative Task Forces (JITs), which provide potential to
48circumnavigate restraints on domestic surveillance. JITs can facilitate
cooperative surveillance by collaborating with other countries. They can
also provide a vector for parallel construction, whereby MLATs are the fig
leaves covering up otherwise illegal surveillance.4 9 JITs can redefine the
investigating party, defining one country's target another country's target.
"Cooperative surveillance" has long been performed as a way around
domestic spying laws through the use of mutual surveillance by
collaborating governments.5 0 Additionally, interlocking MLAT cartels of

See, e.g., David Whedbee, Comment, The FaintShadow of the Sixth Amendment:
SubstantialImbalance in Evidence-GatheringCapacityAbroad Under the U.S. -P.R.C.
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in CriminalMatters, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 561,
561-81 (2003) (arguing that allowing defendants in U.S. criminal proceedings more
international access would enhance constitutional protections).
46

See Nat'1 Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/ncijtf, archivedat https://perma.cc/6CRPC4GP (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
4

48

See id.

See John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. DirectsAgents to Cover Up
Program Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013, 3:25 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805,
archived at http://perma.cc/ASZ2-KK5Q.
4

50

See id.
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cooperating country LEAs might be tempted to function as super-cartels
51
through legal mechanisms such as JITs.
D. MLATs Expand Technical Automation for Global Mass
Surveillance
[16]
MLATs facilitate technical expansion of global surveillance in a
four-step process. In step one, MLATs help governments establish
cooperative control over CSPs.52 In step two, third parties apply pressure
to streamline MLAT requests by automating technical standards and
capabilities for government surveillance.5 3 In step three, with technical
surveillance standards and capabilities, and CSP controls in place,
governments can use tools such as XKeyscore to analyze cleartext
traffic. 5 In step four, by performing timing and traffic correlation
technical attacks against anonymizing tools like MJATs, governments can
improve their chances of de-anonymizing encrypted traffic.
[17]

In step one,

MLATs may play an effective role because

51 See Peter Vogel, The Cloud Privacy Illusion, E-COM. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012, 5:00 AM)
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/rsstory/75848.html.
52

See id.

53 See ANDREW K. WOODS, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, DATA BEYOND BORDERS:
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE 16 (Jan. 2015),

https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI%/"20MLAT%/"20Report.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/7A83-FD47.
54

See FRANK SIEPMANN, MANAGING RISK AND SECURITY IN OUTSOURCING IT SERVICES:

ONSHORE, OFFSHORE AND THE CLOUD 93-94 (2014),

http://www.ittoday.info/Excerpts/OutsourcingITServices.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/M7VK-CWZ2.
See Jing Deng, Richard Han, & Shivakant Mishra, CountermeasuresAgainst Traffic
Analysis Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks, in FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR EMERGING AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, at

secs. 1, 2 (Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng'rs 2005).
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governments exert legal control over CSPs, and therefore network traffic.
MLATs formalize this control throughout the world, and set a standard for
governments exerting control over CSPs. If a country did not exercise
control over its CSPs before enterting into a MLAT, as a MLAT signatory,
it may now have set an obligation or example, and a standard that, like
powerful countries, are expected to do so.
[18]
Next, in the context of established, consolidated CSP control,
MLATs facilitate implementing a mechanical surveillance roadmap. Third
parties use MLATs to facilitate remote surveillance automation.56 Third
parties such as Google are applying pressure via MLATs on
telecommunications and data communications service providers to
incorporate technical standards which implement automated CSP
surveillance. This is turn relieves third parties of legal liability and
ongoing complex legal analysis.
[19]
Further, through enabling MLAT access to surveillance, third
parties hope to stave off increasing pressure from governments around the
world to locate local servers within each of their boundaries, subject to
local government control. * In other words, to preserve their own
autonomy, third parties promote the automation of remote surveillance and
the strengthening of this legal solution. Presented with the options of
either refusing to operate in countries that demand they install local,
surveillance-enabled servers, or strengthening those countries' access to
surveillance through MLAT-encouraged automation, they choose the
latter. However, this results in consequences to citizens living in countries
56 See CTR. FOR INTERNET &

SOC'Y, MLATs

AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR

LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES 1-2, http://cis-india.org/intemetgovernance/blog/presentation-on-mlats.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/7UDL-E2PZ.
5

See id.

See, e.g., Jessica Guynn & David Pierson, Google Blames Chinese Censorsfor Outage,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2010), http://articles.1atimes.com/2010/mar/31/business/la-fi-chinagoogle31-2010mar3 1, archived at http://perma.cc/FF63-MGGT (describing the general
conflict between Google and China).
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with civil liberties protections, like the United States.
[20]
Specifically, corporations urge the use of MLATs to implement
the European
for CSP interfaces-like
technical
standards
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) standards59 to capture
traffic. MLAT-sponsored technical standards form the missing link
between legal instruments and actual massive data stores of recorded
communications data.60 Interestingly, not only governments use MLATs
for this purpose. Third parties like Facebook collaborate with standards
bodies and governments to implement LI technical standards, which are
roadmaps for rolling out automated surveillance.6 1
[21] Third parties may collaborate in the technical and legal facilitation
of remote Internet-based surveillance for multiple reasons. First, they may
seek to reduce and more clearly define the increasing burden of demand
for information from LEAs to CSPs. Second, they may want to avoid
locating surveillance-enabled servers in foreign countries. 62 Third, they
may perceive a need to define the boundaries of legal liability.6 3 We
analyze a number of documents from third parties, like Google,
See Who Are OurMembers, EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST.,
http://www.etsi.org/about/who-we-are, archivedat https://perma.cc/manage/create (last
visited Sept. 25, 2015) ("We have over 800 members drawn from 64 countries across 5
continents. This reflects the increasing globalization of the communications market and
ETSI's key role in enabling it."); What We Are, EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST.,
http://www.etsi.org/about/what-we-are, archivedat http://perma.cc/33P2-VKS3 (last
visited Sept. 25, 2015) ("We are an independent, not-for-profit organization, widely
respected for our neutrality and trustworthiness").
59

60

See Dynamic Triggering,supra note 16.

61

See Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 49.

See Sarah Cortes, In Depth: MJAT JurisdictionalArbitrageMeasurement and
Technical Experiments (September 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) [hereinafter In Depth].
62

63

See id.
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international business consortiums, and international technical standard
setting bodies, like ETSI, to MLATs and government surveillance.
E. MLATs Enable New Attacks on Online Privacy and
Anonymity Tools
[22] Governments use MLATs to launch attacks and analyze the
harvest of information. MLATs work because governments exert legal
control over CSPs, as well as network traffic and MJAT traffic.6 4 MJATs
route traffic all over the world. Once traffic is captured, the third stepanalysis of cleartext communications traffic-can begin. For example,
NSA XKeyscore surveillance tools appear to fit almost precisely, or "snap
in" to work with these standards. 65 Creating paths for network traffic and
building circuits that cross jurisdictions can make surveillance by GIAs
harder.
[23] Beyond analysis of unencrypted data (with traffic captured)
MLATs allow governments of multiple jurisdictions to collaborate in a
fourth step to surveillance: performing hitherto challenging or impossible
attacks on encrypted or anonymous, privacy-protected communications
attacks-such as traffic correlation, traffic analysis, and timing attacksthrough multiple countries. We examine this ability of GIAs to perform
LI, by using MLATs to defeat constitutional protections to online
anonymous communication privacy.6 6 In this step, sovereigns use MLATs
as a kind of Mutual Lawful Interception Treaties.
[24]
64

MLATs are one of several hostility factors, which governments

See supra Part I.d.

See Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA is Still Harvesting Your
Online Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013),
65

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection,
at http://perma.cc/VQ2D-U8EN.
66

See In Depth, supra note 62.
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can display to anonymous network communications. Combined with other
measurable hostility factors, MLAT risk to MJATs can be quantified per
country By becoming jurisdiction-hostility aware, one can improve
anonymity by reducing the risk of surveillance through an approach we
call "jurisdictional arbitrage." 67 The least hostile countries in which
jurisdictional arbitraging privacy tools may concentrate on increasing the
proxy servers to expand and disseminate them across the best mix of
countries to minimize user risk in the maximum jurisdictions.
[25]
Present use of MLATs has become an indicator of legal hostility to
freedom in itself. MLATs routinely invalidate the rights of targets. We
review measures we have developed to quantify MLAT strength and
depth, include "absolute" MLAT hostility and "relative" MLAT hostility.
We briefly review other hostility factors.
[26]
MLATs provide a metric that, in combination with other metrics,
provide a valuable measure of GIA surveillance by country and
consequently cause risk to anonymous network communications. In the
short term, MJATs can reduce risk by modifying their path selection
algorithms to take into account country legal hostility. In the long term,
public awareness of the threat to individual privacy can lead to MLAT
modifications. Using MLAT attacks to extend law to attack jurisdiction
arbitraging privacy tools seems inevitably to result in those tools getting
smarter.
[27]
We show that traffic may pass through inherently hostile countries
with lots of MLATs and large cartels, and apply "absolute" MLAT
hostility coefficients to countries. We show the effect when traffic passes
through cooperating countries of "relative" MLAT hostility. We review
experiments we performed and discuss our methodology. We present the
first complete global MLAT map, and discuss new treaties in comparison
to accession to existing treaties. We present the results of our experiments
and our conclusions: that a high percentage of Tor traffic is at significantly
increased risk due to MLATs, and that the risk can be lowered by
67

See id.
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rerouting and modifying path selection. We further review Internet Service
Providers and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) and their role as potential
surveillance points.
[28]
We classify countries according to MLAT and other legal
"hostility factors" to Internet freedom in general, and the possibility of
deanonymizing MJATs specifically. We develop the first scheme to
measure and quantify country-by-country MLAT collaboration, and thus
risk, and apply the scheme to create MLAT risk measurements for all
countries across the globe. Up to now, researchers have documented a
68
number of technical attacks against MJATs. We now define a new class
of attacks, legal attacks, which facilitate the network traffic correlation,
traffic timing, and traffic analysis class of attacks. We document a specific
new legal attack, the MLAT attack. This allows countries to collaborate
and perform a traffic correlation and timing attacks on all crossjurisdiction MJAT relays or circuits. We show how MJAT traffic risk
increases when it passes through countries with high MLAT legal
hostility. We present MLATs as one of five surveillance "legal hostility
69
factors" quantified in a related paper. We measure two forms of the
MLAT hostility factors: absolute hostility, per country MLAT factor; and
collaborative hostility, MLAT "cartel s." 70
[29]
The expansion of MLATs results in MJATs getting smarter.n
Reducing MLAT score reduces unlawful intercept as a stop to reducing
LI. Our recommendations include short-term changes in technology, such
as the location of Tor relay nodes. We also recommend long-term
changes, such as changing laws involving MLATs and their treaties.

68

See id.

69

See id.

7o

See id.

71

See In Depth, supra note 62.
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II. THE QUIET RISE OF MLATs
[30]
While MLATs themselves are not new, their numbers and scope
have significantly increased since the rise of the Internet-the era when
the public has become aware of significantly increased online activity in
general, as well as cybercrime and surveillance.7 2 "In recent decades, the
United States has ratified an increasing number of bilateral treaties with
other nations to facilitate legal proceedings, known as mutual legal
assistance treaties or MLATs." 73 These proliferating bilateral
agreements-such as the EU-US MLAT 7 4 and the multilateral Budapest
Cybercrime Treaty, which were ratified and entered into force in the
U.S. in 2010 and 2007, respectively-significantly expand the scope of
latitude for LEAs. At the same time, they reduced or eliminated many civil
liberties and other privacy protections for individuals. 7 6
A. MLAT Mechanics
1. Frameworks for Intergovernmental Legal
Cooperation
[31]
Since the 20th century, governments have used a number of tools
to attempt to obtain cooperation in criminal matters. These tools include:
72

See id.

United States v. Global Fishing, Inc. (In re 840 140th Ave. NE) 634 F.3d 557, 563 (9th
Cir. 2011).
73

See Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, U.S-E.U, art. 5, June 25, 2003, 43 I.L.M 758
[hereinafter EU-US MLAT].
See Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 282
[hereinafter Budapest Cybercrime Treaty].
See Amalie M. Weber, The Council ofEurope's Convention on Cybercrime, 18
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 425, 438 (2003).
76

See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, MANUAL ON INT'L COOPERATION IN

CRIMINAL MATTERS RELATED TO TERRORISM 1 (2009) [hereinafter See U.N. MANUAL
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* "spontaneous" cooperation7
* ad hoc processes through extra-territorial orders from individual
-79
countnes
* relationships for cooperation outside of MLATs, like the U.S.
FBI international "24/7 network"8 0
* national and state statutes8 1
* letters rogatory82
* MLAT-type requests such as customs agreements, tax
agreements, and others 8 3
* bilateral treaties, including extradition, MILAT, and others 8 4
* multilateral treaties, including MLAT and others.8 5
[32]
Each framework has its strengths and weaknesses. Some are per
investigation, some are on a best-efforts basis, some are ad hoc, and some
are informal. MLATs reflect an effort to create legally binding agreements
to obligate and compel countries to cooperate on criminal investigations
and related matters such as target extradition.
ON INT'L COOPERATION].
78

See id. at 63-65.

7

See id.

so See id., at 19; see also 24/7 Network of Cyber InvestigatorsGraphic, FED.

BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION,

https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/january/image/24_7network.jpg/view,
https://perma.cc/S6WL-SFAZ (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).

See U.N.

MANUAL ON INT'L COOPERATION, supra note

82

See id. at 79, 114-15.

83

See id.
See id. at 22.

85

See id.
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2. MLAT History
[33]
MLATs have existed for quite some time. In the modern era, a
U.S. MLAT with Kenya contains documents dating from 1931.86 The
United States signed the first non-secret modem MLAT
with
Switzerland in 1977. At their most basic, MLATs formally require and
enable their signatories to cooperate in many aspects of legal assistance,
from investigations, to collection of evidence, to extradition of targets or
suspects.
[34]
A large and increasing body of case law exists with respect to
MLATs. While no case directly holding on issues raised by MLATs has
come before the Supreme Court, some such cases bear on MLATs. These
include United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 89 and United States v.
Alvarez-Machain,9 0 a pair of related Mexican cases involving narcotics
86

See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, COMPENDIUM OF BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND

INT'L AGREEMENTS ON EXTRADITION AND MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIM.
MATTERS KENYA

3 (2010).

This is the first non-secret "modern" U.S. MLAT. Of course, we are not aware of
earlier secret MLATs that still remain secret. For an example of a formerly secret treaty
which is no longer secret, see Gunnar Rensfeldt, NSA "askingfor"specific exchanges
from FRA - Secret treaty since 1954, SVT.SE (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.svt.se/ug/nsafra4,
archived at http://perma.cc/SZ5B-EKJ9.
87

Treaty between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S.
8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977).
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990) (determining
Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to searches and seizures by U.S. agents of
property owned by a nonresident alien in a foreign country).
8

See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (holding a defendant's
capture by forcible abduction in another country does not prohibit his trial in the U.S. for
violations of U.S. laws, and, that the US is not requiredto follow an extradition treaty
procedure, that is optional).
90
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involving the murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) official.
Verdugo-Urquidez established that U.S. Fourth Amendment protections
do not apply to searches and seizures by U.S. officials of non-resident,
non-citizens in a foreign country, such as those requested in MLATs. 91
Alvarez-Machain established that LEAs may operate outside MLATs, and
tacitly sanctioned a DEA arrest via illegal abduction. 9 2
3. MLAT Classifications
[35]
There are multiple kinds of MLATs, and their classification may
be viewed along multiple vectors-including signatory scope, category of
law, law enforcement goal, treaty focus, criminal threat model, phase, and
status. There are multiple sub-options within those classifications. The
first vector-signatory scope-may be multilateral (global or regional),
bilateral, or unilateral. Multilateral MLATs enshrine agreements between
more than two countries.9 3 Bilateral MLATs enshrine agreements between
two countries. 94 Monolateral MLATs may be considered one-way laws,
enacted by some countries to enable them to assist foreign MLA in the
absence of actual bilateral agreements with other countries. 9 5 Regional
multilateral MLATs may involve only a handful of countries, while global
multilateral MLATs may involve almost every country. A country may
enter into both a multilateral MLAT with another country, and a bilateral
91

See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275.

92

See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669-70.

See Definition ofMultilateral, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/multilateral, archivedat http://perma.cc/T8J8BMNL (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
93

See Definition ofBilateral,DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/bilateral?s=t, archived at http://perma.cc/YAK3X3ME (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
94

See Definition of Unilateral,DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/unilateral, archived at http://perma.cc/BEA698AG (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
95

22

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXII, Issue I

treaty with that country, creating legal overlap. Organizations
administering multilateral MLATs include the E.U., the Council of
Europe, the U.N., the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the
Organization of American States.9 6
[36]
Naturally, not all MLATs are created equal. Some multilaterals
MILATs are not directly enforceable in the member states. 9 7 Instead,
signatories are required to adopt laws or procedures which have the
desired effect and are enforceable. For example, in the United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Trafficking Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, "signatories are required to [implement laws or] procedures
which will enable the signatories' own authorities to 'identify, seize, and
freeze' proceeds or property derived from illegal drug activities." 98 For
this reason, bilateral treaties are considered significantly stronger than
many multilateral treaties.
[37]
A treaty's category of law may be either civil or criminal, as some
MLATs deal with civil law and others with criminal law. We concern
ourselves primarily with criminal MLATs or MLAT provisions. The law
enforcement goal of treaties may include extradition (or what some call a
rendition) or non-extradition mutual legal assistance. Extradition or
rendition treaties are often viewed as separate from MLATs, but they are

See, e.g., Dep't of Int'l Law, Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in
CriminalMatters Preamble, ORG. OF AM. STATES,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-55.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/HC2ZMGCE (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
96

See Thomas F. McInerney III, Note, Towards the Next Phase in InternationalBanking
Regulation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 143, 164-65 (1994) (stating "[a]lthough not selfevidently applicable, the Drug Convention may supply some needed assistance in
developing a truly multilateral solution to the problem of illicit bank activities...
Although not directly enforceable in the member states.").
97

98 Id. (quoting United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances art. 5, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M.493).
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closely related.9 9
[38]
In the fourth category, treaty focus, a treaty may be either simply a
general MLAT, or it may have MLA provisions incidental to other treaty
foci. Examples include tax agreements, customs agreements, Hague
Convention on Child Abduction, 100 and Schengen Acquis Treaty. 10 1
[39]
Motivation for a number of MLATs has been linked to campaigns
against specific crimes. 10 2 These MLATs may be narrow, and may overlap
with other MLATs. Criminal threats-the fifth MLAT classification
vector-may include one or more specific criminal threats. These may
include narcotics, anti-bribery, human trafficking, skyjacking, organized
crime, terrorism, weapons trafficking (including nuclear weapons), or tax
evasion incident to banking secrecy laws.
[40]
MLATs typically take five to ten years to develop between a few
principal phases.103 For this reason, attempts to identify treaties by date
See Definition ofExtradition Treaty, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Extradition+treaty, archived at http://perma.cc/257D
QRMQ (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
100
See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670.
-

99

101 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union,
the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of
checks at their common borders (Schengen Acquis Treaty), June 14, 1985, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(0 1), archived at
http://perma.cc/6M29-VJNY.

102

See, e.g., Brian Kindle, MLATS Are Powerful Weapons in FinancialCrime Combat,

Even for Private Sector, Assoc. OF CERTIFIED FINC. CRIM. SPECIALISTS,

http://www.acfcs.org/mlats-are-powerful-weapons-in-counter-financial-crime-combateven-for-private-sector/, archived at http://perma.cc/8284-Y86Z (discussing MLATs
specific to financial crimes).
103 See generally Jonah Force Hill, ProblematicAlternatives: MLAT Reform for the
DigitalAge, HARv. NAT'L SEC. L.J. (Jan. 28, 2015 1:05 PM),
http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/,
archived at http://perma.cc/VE9Y-2CVV.
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can result in greater confusion. We classify MLATs by a sixth vectorphase-to clarify whether and where it may be in force. Phases include
drafting, signing, acceptance, approval, ratification, deposit of instrument,
accession, and entry into force. These can all happen on different dates, or
the same date, depending on the treaty.
[41]
Only in the last of these phases is the MLAT actually in effect, a
status often referred to as "treaty in force." 1 0 4 For this and other reasons,
such as expiration or a country ceasing to exist, a treaty may have a status
of "not in force."
Another issue with MLATs is finding definitive
sources and agreeing on a definitive citation. As they are by nature signed
by at least two parties, each party may claim to hold the definitive
reference. Not to mention each treaty has multiple versions on its long
journey from drafting to entry into force.
Cumulative treaties by Year
120

UTotal
Cumulative

90

60

30

0

Year

Figure 4. India, U.S., and U.S. MLAT growth. 106
104 See Definition ofTreaties in Force, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-

dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Treaties+in+Force, archived at http://perma.cc/69AG3F6S (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
1os See What is Entry Into Force?, THE EUCLID TREATY,
http://www.euclidtreaty.org/what-is-entry-into-force/, archivedat http://perma.cc/Y7RNV368 (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
106 See Sarah Cortes, MLATDatabase (unpublished research results) (on file with author).
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4. MLAT Measurement - The MLAT Database
[42]
In this article, we perform the first comprehensive and global
analysis of MLATs. From original sources, we have constructed what isto our knowledge-the first complete database of all MLATs, providing
the first MLAT big picture. Between 1977 and 2013, the number of
MLAT relationships between all countries grew from a few to several
hundred.1 0 7 During this period, the number of participating countries grew
also. 108 Between the U.S., and the U.K. alone treaties grew from 1 to
105. 109
[43]
MLAT analysis shows that new adversarial models are necessary
to take into account global surveillance, and that different governments
may pose different, quantifiable risks to civil liberties and anonymous
network communications, based on observable factors such as MLATs in
force. The database consists of 32 tables and reports. Tables capture links
to the original documents, the official source repository for the document,
lists of signatory countries, dates, and any other available information.
Some tables capture multilateral treaty information, and others capture
bilateral treaty information. We summarize the various treaties and treaty
sets in a summary table.
[44]
We use the ISO 3166 standard to identify 191 autonomous
governments in the world. 10 A set of scripts loop through various tables to
107

See id.

108

See id.

109 See id.

110 SeeCountry Codes -ISP 3166, INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/country codes, archived at http://perma.cc/8HX6-WWQT (last
visited Dec. 3, 2015) (stating "ISO 3166 is the International Standard for country codes
and codes for their subdivisions."). As of October 4, 2015, ISO 3166 recognized 249
"countries." Online Browsing Platform, INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search (last visited Oct. 4, 2015); see also ISO 3166-1,
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create summaries and reports, including total number of treaties entered
into by countries, and which countries have treaty relationships with each
other. We then bring to light MLA T cartels, groups of countries that have
entered into treaty relationships with each other, whose LEAs may
cooperate. We provide for treaty risk weights to experiment with different
scoring algorithms.
B. Motives for MLAT Growth and Expansion
1. Roots Combatting Money Laundering
[45] Mark M. Richard-the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division-testified to the advantages of MLATs over letters
rogatory to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1987.111 He stated "an

MLAT, either by itself or in conjunction with domestic implementing
legislation, can provide a means of overcoming bank and business secrecy
laws that have in the past so often frustrated the effective investigation of
large-scale narcotics trafficking operations." 112
[46] In the 1970s, against a backdrop of bank secrecy laws and the
emergence of offshore tax havens, the rise of the Internet saw a rise in
money laundering crimes, including the two largest categories, narcoticshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1#cite_note-6, archived at
https://perma.cc/EP4D-XDTN (last modified Aug. 10, 2015). The U.N. recognizes and
maintains a list of sixty-nine Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories; however, twentyone of these have no separate country code and are not listed in ISO 3166. See Country
Codes - ISP 3166, INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/country_ codes.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2015).
So, the total number of countries with autonomous or semi-autonomous governments in
the world today can be evaluated as 201 countries.
WIKIPEDIA.ORG,

111 See Worldwide Review ofStatus of U.S. Extradition Treaties and Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 26

(1987) (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division).
112

Id. at 37.
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and bribery related crimes. 113 This partially drove MLAT expansion after
1977. Complex international cases-notably, one concerning commodities
trader Marc Rich, then the largest tax evasion case in U.S. history-drove
the U.S. Department of Justice to seek more formal methods to gain
international cooperation and legal assistance from other governments. 114
[47]
Since then, an increasing number of MLATs have been
implemented around the world. Treaty growth is driven by a number of
factors, including both government and corporate agendas. The latter
include the desire to expand business abroad unfettered by bribery
demands and-more recently-legal uncertainties regarding CSP
obligations to provide subscriber information to LEAs. Corporate
anti-bribery initiatives played a significant motivating role in the
expansion of MLATs in recent decades. The poorest countries may be the
most frequent targets of enforcement.1 15
[48] Choi and Davis found that "at the country level we report evidence
that the SEC and DOJ impose greater aggregate sanctions for violations in
countries with a lower per capita and weaker local anti-bribery
institutions."116 Further, this skew may not be related to a higher
113 See History ofAnti-Money LaunderingLaws, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
http://www.fincen.gov/newsroom/amli_history.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2015). See
also The Critical Connection Between the Internetand Money Laundering, RED EARTH
INTEL, Jan. 1, 2015, http://www.redearthintel.com/1/post/2015/ 0 1/the-criticalconnection-between-the-internet-and-money-laundering.html; Country Codes - ISP
3166, supra note 110.
114

See ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 338 (1993).
115 See Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, ForeignAffairs and Enforcement of the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct 14 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-35, Law & Economics Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 12-15, 2012),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2116487, archivedat
http://perma.cc/DV4J-AFGQ.
116

id. at i.
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prevalence of guilt by poorer countries, as Choi and Davis go on to
conclude: "overall, these findings suggest that factors besides those
deemed relevant by U.S. and international law influence enforcement of
the FCPA."1 17 For example, the OECD treaties-where Asian countries
predominate-reflect an emphasis on reducing the cost of doing business
(i.e., the cost of bribes) for wealthy companies leveraging profits in poor
countries.118
[49]
Sadly, MLATs and other tools failed to recover the estimated $5
billion the Marcoses laundered out of the Philippines-mainly to Swiss
banks1 19-or to provide restitution or justice to their victims of domestic
terror. 120
2. Returning the Favor: Performance Certainty
[50]
Fed up with years of lacking assistance from other governments in
the pursuit of bank secrecy targets like Marc Rich, the U.S. DOJ first
negotiated MLATs-like the 1977 one with Switzerland-to have teeth in
compelling other governments to cooperate and assist.121 Thirty years
later, their success demonstrated apparent but unintended consequences
for Boston College academics. ACLU of Massachusetts summed up in its

brief:
[t]he government . . . maintains that the Applicants are not
117

id.

118 See ADB/OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: MUTUAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE, EXTRADITION AND RECOVERY OF PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION IN

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 25 (2007).
119

See David Chaikin, Tracking the Proceeds of OrganisedCrime - The Marcos Case,

AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, Mar. 9-10, 2000 at 4-5.
120

See Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 854 (2008).

121 See Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force 1977).
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entitled to any judicial review. In the government's view,
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the U.S. and
the U.K. authorizes a foreign power, acting with the
Executive's unreviewable stamp of approval, to compel
citizens
to produce
confidential
information for
prosecutions abroad. 122
[51]
Countries also sought to ensure performance certainty with
MLATs. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit reversed an order overruling
MLAT compliance with a request from Canada regarding a smuggling
operation, holding that "MLATs . . . have the desired quality of
compulsion as they contractually obligate the two countries to provide to
each other evidence and other forms of assistance needed in criminal
cases," 123 both during pre-charge investigation and post-charge
prosecution stages. 1 2 4 The court also ruled that
despite the apparent versatility of 28 U.S.C. § 1782-titled
"[a]ssistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants
before such tribunals-law enforcement authorities found the
statute to be an unattractive option in practice because it provided
wide discretion in the district court to refuse the request and did
not obligate other nations to return the favor that it grants." 12 5
[52]
Press coverage of the First Circuit missed the point that MLAT
treaty compliance is intended by its drafters to be non-discretionary. 12 6
122 Br. for Ed Moloney & Anthony McIntyre as Amici Curiae Supp. Appellants at 6,
United States v. Maloney (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (No. 11-25 11)
[hereinafter Br. for Ed Maloney].
123

In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003).

124

See id.

125

id.

126

See United Kingdom v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 718 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2013).
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Those that grasped this argued that the Boston College Trustees should
have challenged this point more strenuously, and pursued the request to
the court to quash the subpoenas on grounds of academic freedom, among
others. 1 2 7 We discuss this case in further detail later. 12 8
[53]
Regarding MLAT performance certainty, Senator John Kerryironically a member since 1990 of the same Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that approved MLATs, including Chair from 2009-2013, and
now Secretary of State himself-wrote a letter regarding Trustees of
Boston College to the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. 12 9 In that
letter, he wrote:
Given my deep concern, I spoke to Attorney General
Holder about this matter late last year. I fully recognize that
the United Kingdom has invoked the provisions of our
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and that this is clearly a
factor that affects our flexibility dealing with such a
request. Nonetheless, given the close relationship we have
with the United Kingdom and the deep and enduring
interest all of us share in seeing a lasting peace in Northern
Ireland, I would urge you to work with the British
authorities to reconsider the path they have chosen and
revoke their request.130

127 See, e.g., Ed Moloney, EdMoloney: Boston College andMe, Bos. COLL. SUBPOENA
NEWS (Aug. 11, 2014), https://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/2014/08/11/edmoloney-boston-college-and-me/; Country Codes -ISP 3166, supra note 110.
128

See discussion infra Part II.B.3.

129 Letter from John Kerry, Sen., U.S. Cong., to Hilary Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. State
Dept. (Jan. 23, 2012).

Id.; see also Ross Kerber, Kerry Reaches out on Northern Ireland "Troubles"Records,
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2012, 5:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-usabritain-iraidUSTRE8OQ27R20120127?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChan
nel= 11563, archived at http://perma.cc/9QYJ-WKDC.
130
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No one knew better than Kerry, since he-ironically, as Chair-approved
the US-UK-MLAT that voluntarily tied its own hands.131 It was to Kerry's
committee that Rotenberg had addressed his apparently unheeded 2004
testimony. 132
[54]
MLATs strictly compel parties targeted for investigation to
perform under the MLAT, but do not seem to likewise compel the
Attorney General to require enforcing countries to conform to MLAT
terms. In Boston College Trustees, the government attempts to argue just
that, stating:
[T]his Court affirmed in In re: Request, the US-UK MLAT
by express terms precludes a private party from refusing to
comply with a request for production of documents on the
ground that the requirements of the treaty have not been
followed. Thus, even if Price's death did call into question
whether the United States was still required to provide the
documents to the UK pursuant to the treaty, which it does
not, that would not absolve Boston College of its obligation
to provide the documents to the United States and this
appeal would remain viable. 13 3
[55]
The First Circuit has cited the US-UK MLAT in ruling it allows
the US Attorney General to decide to pursue a request despite
noncompliance with treaty terms: "Treaty is intended solely for mutual
legal assistance between the parties. The provisions of this Treaty shall not
give rise to a right on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress, or

131 See Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, U.S.-U.K., art. I, Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S. 96-1202
(1995) [hereinafter US-UK MLAT].
132

See Hearing, supra note 38.

133 Gov't's Opp. to Bos. Coll.'s Mot. to Dismiss its Appeal as Moot, at 9, United States v.
Trs. of Bos. Coll., 718 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1236) (citing United States v.
Moloney (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2012)).
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exclude any evidence, or to impede execution of a request."134
3. Executive v. Judicial Branches
[56]
There can be little doubt, when reviewing current court cases and
government briefs, that our executive branch views MLATs as a general
strategy to expand its powers and enable law enforcement aims to
supersede constitutional protections when reviewing current court cases
and government briefs. Having attempted to remove judicial discretion
from the treaties, the government's position since then has been to
convince the judicial branch of its resulting lack of power to enforce
constitutional protections. For example, in Boston College Trustees, the
Court summarizes the Executive Branch's position:

.

The government, for its part, contends that courts do not
have discretion under the US-UK MLAT to review for
relevance materials subject to a subpoena. It states that only
the Attorney General, not the courts, has discretion to
decline, delay or narrow a request under the treaty. . .
Pursuant to Article 3 of the US-UK MLAT, it is the
Attorney General who decides whether to accede to a
request from the UK, to narrow compliance to a certain
aspect of said request or to decline to cooperate altogether.
The government, however, erroneously concludes that the
Attorney General's exclusive prerogative in initiating
proceedings translates into a general bar on judicial
oversight of the subpoena enforcement process.135

[57]
The court in Commissioner 's Subpoenas also noted "United States
courts have consistently ruled that similar provisions in other treaties do
not important substantive constitutional or statutory protections into the

In re Price, 685 F.3d at 11-12; see also US-UK MLAT, supra note 131, at art. I.
United Kingdom v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 718 F.3d 13, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
134
135
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It concluded

[p]rior cases involving similar language in other treaties
further illustrate that vague and general references to the
'law of the Requested State' in treaties must be carefully
construed in the context of all the language of the Treaty
and cannot simply be read in mechanical fashion as the
appellees contend . . . . 13 7
The court goes on to cite Elcock v. United States-an extradition treaty
case-which, while distinguishable, found:
Had the parties intended that each would apply its own
[substantive] law in determining whether the requested
extradition would violate double jeopardy principles, they
could have clearly stated as much... In the absence of such
a provision, a court may not simply rely on the meanings
the terms of the treaty have in the context of domestic
law.138
Additionally, the Second Circuit established that the U.S. government may
conduct investigations and obtain evidence outside MLAT provisions.139
In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d at 1303 (citing Elcock v. United States, 80 F.
Supp. 2d 70, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)).
137 In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d at 1302.
136

138 Elcock, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 77. Elcock robbed a bank in Germany with his girlfriend
accomplice, concealed over $419,000 in a teddy bear, and mailed it to his sister in the
U.S. He was arrested and convicted in New York shortly thereafter, when he arrived to
visit his sister, and accepted delivery of the teddy bear. Elcock is also interesting
constitutionally, as it permitted extradition in an apparent double jeopardy case (related
not to an MLAT, but an extradition treaty), as Germany sought to prosecute him after his
U.S. conviction.
139 United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2007). Dutch national Henk
Rommy, also known as the "Cobra," headed an international drug ring that trafficked in
large quantities of controlled substances like "ecstasy"... [Co-conspirators] testified that
the pills in question were light blue in color and stamped with the logo of the late Italian
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[58]
The little noticed 2003 Eleventh Circuit case In re Commissioner's
Subpoenas 140 already provided the grounds on which Rotenberg's
prophecy for the Budapest Cybercrime Treaty would come true: 14 1 that
"vague and general references" to legal protections offer scant protection
to privacy and other civil liberties in treaties. 142
[59]
Perhaps noting the ease with which the judicial branch sustained
the executive branch's inclination to deprioritize civil protections, we see
that an increasing number of treaties explicitly exclude civil liberties in
recent years.143

[60]
However, cases are currently working their way through the courts
in which they take responsibility for review of MLAT requests, reasserting
judicial review and the supremacy of the Constitution. 1 4 4 The executive
branch continues to fight back on these efforts, through government
appeals
4. Surveillance-Related Motives: Governments

fashion designer Gianni Versace . . [Romy] had smuggled the drugs in recreational
vehicles shipped from Europe . . into New York. Id at 111; see also Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Neth., art. 18, § 1, June 12, 1981, 35 U.S.T. 1361
(1981).
See generally In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
that a request under a mutual legal assistance treaty is not reviewable by a district court).
140

See Br. for Ed Moloney supra note 122, at 22. See generallyBudapest Cybercrime
Treaty, supra note 75.
141

142

See Hearing, supra note 38, at 39-41; In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d at 1302.

143

See Trs. ofBos. Coll., 718 F.3d at 20-21.

144

See, e.g., United States v. Maloney (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
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[61]
An examination of treaties-including the EU MLAC,14 5 the EUU.S. MLAT, 14 6 and the multilateral Budapest Cybercrime Treaty1 47
reveals their emphasis on surveillance, including online and
telecommunications. While MLATs have been used to proliferate
surveillance mechanically-they have also served to provide a littleobserved legal basis for global surveillance by GIAs.
[62]
Was extending surveillance globally a key motivating factor
behind recent MLATs, or a by-product? For the answer to that question,
we need look no further than public testimony by its drafters, on which the
2011 Global Fishing decision places so much emphasis. 14 8 For example,
in 2005, Mary Ellen Warlow-the Director of the Office of International
Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice-made a statement
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning law
enforcement treaties.149 She testified:
[T]his is the first United States MLAT to include special
investigative techniques among permissible types of

145 Convention on Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters Between the Member States of
the European Union (Dec. 2011), 2000 O.J. (C 197) 1 (EU) [hereinafter EU MLAC],
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:C2000/197/01&from=EN, archivedat
http://perma.cc/87TK-5JE4.
146

EU-ES MLAT, supra note 74.

Council of Europe (C.O.E.): Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 41 I.L.M.
282.
147

14s United States v. Global Fishing, Inc. (In re 840 140th Ave. NE), 634 F.3d 557, 563
(9th Cir. 2011).
Statement of Mary Ellen Warlow, Director, Office ofInternationalAffairs, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department ofJustice: Hearing ConcerningLaw Enforcement Treaties
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87297.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/72C7-2NC5.
149
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assistance. Specifically, Article 12 establishes that the
Parties may
use telecommunications
surveillance,
undercover investigations, and controlled deliveries, in
accordance with their domestic law, in execution of
requests for assistance. This provision was included at
Germany's request, to assert the Federal government's legal
authority, through the States, to undertake such actions on
behalf of foreign authorities.1 50
Samuel M. Witten-the Deputy Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department Of
State-further testified before the Committee on "An Extradition Treaty
With Great Britain And Northern Ireland, . . . Israel, . . . Germany, and . .
Japan,"
stating:
The proposed U.S.-Germany Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty in Criminal Matters (MLAT) fills a significant gap
in our network of MLATs with major European law
enforcement partners . . . . The MLAT with Germany is
typical of our over 50 MLATs with countries around the
world, including most of the countries of Europe. It has
several innovations, including provisions on special
investigative techniques, such as telecommunications
surveillance, undercover investigations, and controlled
deliveries. It allows certain uses for evidence or
information going beyond the particular criminal

15

o Id. at 10.

15 Testimony by Deputy Legal Adviser, DepartmentofState, to Senate ForeignRelations
Committee regardingcertain bilaterallaw enforcement treaties, U.S. Senate: Hearingon
an Extradition Treaty with GreatBritain and Northern Ireland, an ExtraditionProtocol
with Israel, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Germany, and a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty with Japan Before the S. Committee on ForeignRelations, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Samuel M. Witten, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State),
http://www.state.gov/s/1/2005/87190.htm, archivedat http://perma.cc/5STL-UXDW.

37

Volume XXII, Issue I

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

investigation or proceeding. . .

152

[63]
Broad surveillance provisions are found in every MLAT of this
era. For example, Title III of the EU MLAC explicitly and in detail
authorizes the use of "Interception of Telecom." 1 5 3 Article 20 is noted for
its implications: "[i]nterception of telecommunications without the
technical assistance of another Member State." 1 5 4 Surveillance has been
automated to the point where Member State assistance in surveillance is
no longer operationally necessary.
[64]
By contrast, the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters-which has more than 20 signatory statesspecifically mentions neither telecommunications interception nor
surveillance. 156 The Budapest Cybercrime Treaty contains extensive
provisions for surveillance of real time metadata, as well as content.
This extends to a requirement that signatories conceal the fact of
surveillance: "[e]ach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to oblige a service provider to keep confidential the
fact of the execution of any power provided for in this article and any
information related to it."158

152

id.

153

See EU MLAC, supra note 145.

15

1 Id.

155

at 13.

See Dynamic Triggering, supra note 16.

156 See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 23, 1992, O.A.S. No. 75,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/englishl/treaties/a-55.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/2TU8EZ9V.
157
15

See Budapest Cybercrime Treaty, supra note 75 at tit. 5, art. 20-21.
1Id. at art. 20, section 3.
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[65]
The EU-U.S. MLAT-into which parties entered negotiations
shortly after 9/11, and which entered into force in 2010-provides broad
powers that include surveillance.159 It provides, "[m]utual [...] assistance
shall be afforded to a national administrative authority," investigating
matters for a criminal prosecution could include requests for surveillance
or the interception of communications.160 Under Article 7, broad requests
can be made by "fax or e-mail, with formal confirmation to follow when
required by the requested State." 16 1
[66]
Referring to Article 5, Section 3, StateWatch.org commented:
EU law enforcement officers in the joint teams from the
state where the operation is being conducted will be
allowed to circumvent formal requests for mutual
assistance by directly requesting surveillance by other
national agencies, the interception of telecommunications,
search warrants, arrest and detention. No mechanisms for
accountability are set out.162
5. Surveillance-Related Motives: Third Parties
[67]
Third parties play an important role in pushing the expansion of
MILATs.163 Dramatic increases in requests to third parties for otherwise
private communications has led to their collaboration in implementing
technical standards and capabilities for surveillance. We summarize

159

See EU-US MLAT, supra note 75.

160

Id. at 16.

161

Id. at 15.

162 EU: JHA Council authorisessigning ofEU-USA agreementson extradition and
mutual legal assistance, STATEWATCH.ORG (June 5, 2003),
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jun/O1useu.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/YG4A-WTGP.
163

See Dynamic Triggering, supra note 16.
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briefly here.
[68]
Responding to pressure from governments around the world for
access to subscribers' private data and communications, third parties like
Facebook have lobbied to implement technical standards facilitating
surveillance through MLATs.164 In this way, MLATs play a quiet role in
mandating technological solutions to facilitate government surveillance.
Through ETSI standards, like ETSI Technical Standard 102 677,165
[69]
third parties have sought to incorporate CSP Lawful Intercept technical
design and infrastructure standards and requirements into MLATs, to
166
facilitate remote surveillance automation.
It appears from various treaty
provisions that this automation has been taken into account, and is
assumed. For example, Article 20 of the EU MLAC covers Interception
of Telecommunications without the technical assistance of Another
Member State. 167

[70]
MLATs also invoke action immediately upon ratification in
another sense: the requirement to implement specific legislationincluding international technical standards like ETSI TS 102 677-which
details dynamic triggering" for fully automated "lawful" interception (i.e.,
surveillance). 168 Another interesting standard is ETSI TS 187 005,
164

See id.

165 See generally ETSI DTS 102 677 VO. 4.1 (2010-03), Lawful Interception (LI); Dynamic
Triggering; Dynamic Triggering of Content of CommunicationInterception, Work Item:
DTS/LI-00058, ELEC. TELECOMMS STANDARDS INST. (Mar. 2010) (defining the standard),
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/TSGS3_LI/2010_37_NYC/SA3LI10_049
.doc (automatic download) (detailing the technical design and infrastructure standards for
communication service providers (CSP) and dynamic triggering across multiple
operators) [hereinafter ETSI DTS 102 677].
166

See Dynamic Triggering, supra note 16.

Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the Member States
and the European Union, supra note 156, at 13-14.
167

168

See ETSI DTS 102 677, supra note 165.
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Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocolsfor
Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Lawful Interception; Stage 1 and
Stage 2 definition.1 6 9
[71]
Others
have
documented
extensive
collaboration
by
telecommunications and other third parties on purveying information to
the U.S. government.17 0 However, the collaboration by third parties with
foreign GIAs through MLATs has received scant attention. How
collaboration with non-U.S.-countries can impact U.S. citizens has also
received scant attention.
[72]
In the past, evidence was collected by law enforcement agencies.
When one government LEA sought evidence from another jurisdiction, it
generally sought it from the other jurisdiction's LEA. But with the advent
of electronic communications, foreign governments are increasingly
seeking evidence from foreign third parties-mostly U.S. third parties like
Google, Twitter, and Facebook. The increasing demands on third parties
for access to subscribers' personal communications information has
effectively compelled third parties like Facebook to exert pressure to
expand MLATs, in order to set boundaries for this demand. 171 Hosein and
Banisar observed of the then-draft Budapest Cybercrime Treaty that "[its]
169 See generally ETSI DTS 187 005 V3.1.1 (2012-06), Telecommunications and Internet
Converged Services and Protocolsfor Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Lawful
Interception; Stage 1 and Stage 2 definition, ELECTRONIC TELECOMMS STANDARDS INST.
(June, 2012) [hereinafterETSIDTS 187 005],
http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi-ts/ 187000_187099/187005/03.01.01_60/ts 187005v0301
0lp.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/2D9Q-NTHH (defining and specifying, when the
network supplying services on behalf of the communication service provider is a next
generation network, stage 1 and stage 2 of interception capability and the stage 2 model
for lawful interception).
170

See NSA Spying on Americans, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/nsaspying, archivedat https://perma.cc/6SQ5-RXR3 (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).

171 See Global Government Surveillance Reform, REFORM GOv'T SURVEILLANCE,
https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/index.html, archivedat
https://perma.cc/H4MS-8ABA (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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requirements are extremely expansive in scope, and impose significant
burdens on Internet providers, operators, users and equipment
manufacturers to collect information, conduct surveillance and provide
assistance." 1 7 2
[73]
The recent increase in corporate transparency reports and
takedown demands documents this. In the first six months of 2013,
petitioners from almost 100 countries had submitted almost 25,000
takedown requests to Google alone. 173 Transparency reports from
Microsoft, 1 7 4 Twitter,17 5 Facebook, 1 7 6 and others report similar trends. The
desire by these third parties to set boundaries on these requests is a key
driving factor behind the involvement of CSP in MLATs. In becoming so
involved, third parties found themselves drawn deeper and deeper into
MLAT surveillance collaboration. This resulted in a marriage between not
only the global CSPs and U.S. surveillance interests like the NSA, but
GIAs of all countries.
[74]
A number of documents reveal the extent of this corporate
involvement. By September 2012, the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) 177 was drafting detailed recommendations for
172 David Banisar & Gus Hosein, A Draft Commentary on the Council ofEurope
Cybercrime Convention (Oct. 2002), http://privacy.openflows.org/pdf/coe analysis.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/5SNC-THQT.
173 See Google TransparencyReport, GOOGLE,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wt3DCBmGOJp8YL6auFtSQJ91CcGGZ6 1GKeo
sHRfOtLs/edit#gid=7453038 (last updated Sept. 23, 2015).
174 See Microsoft Law Enforcement Requests Report, MICROSOFT,
https://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/transparencyhub/lerr/,
archived at https://perma.cc/6ULU-SC7F (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).

175 See Removal Requests, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com, archived at
https://perma.cc/7RZN-77LD (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
176 See Global Government Requests Report, January-June2013, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/government requests, archivedat
https://perma.cc/Y6T4-UR7Q (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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MLATS." By 2010, the ICC was already involved in recommending
technical standards for "best practices for lawful intercept requirements,"
including "dynamic triggering." 179 By 2012, it issued detailed
recommendations for MLAT modifications. 18 0 The ICC refers to MLAT
terms that enable and facilitate third party collaboration in LI as "benefits
for governments, LEAs, and CSPs", and enumerates:
* Consistent requirements can also help CSPs respond to LI
requests in ways that accelerate access to data for LEAs, including
by:
0 Providing CSPs with clarity on LI requirements, which in
turn reduces the real or perceived risk of subsequent legal
challenge to a CSP decision to supply data and avoids the
need for complex dialogues on legal requirements and
processes; and
0 Allowing CSPs to ensure that they have requisite legal
authority to implement existing technical protocols for
cross-border LI, such as the proposed European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) "dynamic
triggering" process for mobile wiretaps.1 8 1
Investopedia describes the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) as
the "largest,
and arguably most diverse, business organization in the world with thousands of member
companies representing over 130 countries and a vast array of business interests."
InternationalChamber of Commerce-ICC, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/i/international-chamber-of-commerce-icc.asp, archived at http://penna.cc/2MAYXSLT (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
177

178 INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM'M ON THE DIGITAL ECON., TASK FORCE
ON
INTERNET AND TELECOMS, USING MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES (MLATS) To
IMPROVE CROSS-BORDER LAWFUL INTERCEPT PROCEDURES, Doc. No. 373/512 (Dec. 9,

2012), http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2012/mlat/,
archived at http://perma.cc/W73B-3SXF [hereinafter POL'Y STATEMENT OF 2012].
179

Id. at 2, 5.

180

Id.

181

Id. at 5.
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[75]
The ICC acknowledges the risks to privacy, and gives a nod to
individual rights, observing: "new processes for transferring personal
information can raise tensions with privacy and data protection rights
under national and transnational law. Both concerns are extremely
important, and can be managed in a responsible manner."182 However, few
ideas are proposed for effectively protecting those rights.
[76]
In 2010, the ICC recommended member countries adopt
internationally consistent technical standards for LI. 18 3 Later, it noted that
adoption and implementation of ETSI DTS 102 677 "could be influential"
in ensuring CSPs "have the requisite legal authority to implement existing
[and proposed] technical protocols for cross-border LI." 18 4 The proposed
ETSI DTS 102 677 standard is one of a large set of LI technical standards
for CSPs, which detail technically how surveillance works. 1 5 ETSI TS
187 005 provides further technical detail about how CSPs actually pick up
our communications.186

[77]
Facebook, Google, and other third parties work through the trade
organization ICC to implement international surveillance technology
standards.1 87 The multi-stakeholder group Global Network Initiative-in

182 POL'Y STATEMENT

2012, supra note 178, at 6.

183 INT'L CHAMBER OF COM., COMM'N ON

E-Bus., IT

AND TELECOMS, TASK FORCE ON
INTERNET AND TELECOMS INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERV'S (ITIS), GLOBAL Bus.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR LAWFUL INTERCEPT REQUIREMENTS 1, 6-

7 (2010), http://www.iccindiaonline.org/policy-statement/2.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/L53G-9WSW.
1s1 POL'Y STATEMENT OF

2012, supra note 178, at 5.

115

ESTI DTS 102 677, supra note 165, at 7.

186

ETSI DTS 187 005, supra note 169.

1s7 GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org,
http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index.php?qt-gniparticipants= 1#qt44
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which Google and Microsoft, as well as other CSPs, participateannounced in its 2015 public policy agenda: "Data Beyond Borders:
Mutual Legal Assistance in the Internet Era," setting forth a public policy
agenda to help further shape MLAT policy.1 88
[78]
A critical concept reflected in these documents is dynamic
triggering. 189 ETSI TS 102 677 defines dynamic triggering as "a
framework and architecture for achieving dynamic invocation of [Content
of Communication (CC)]." 190 In other words, global CSP through ICC are
recommending standards to accomplish interception, not just of metadata
like time of communications and parties' names, but of the
communications themselves. ETSI TS 102 677 goes on to state that its
protocols are intended
to be re-usable in any generic service domain and transport
network scenario requiring the use of dynamic activation of
lawful interception. The framework and architecture in the
present document when included within specific service
domain standards (e.g. 3GPP IMS) and transport network
standards provides a consistent and inter-operable approach
to dynamic triggering across multiple technology standards
and/or multiple operators. The present document enhances
other LI specifications to provide interoperability across
different technologies or domains.191
[79]

The role of MLATs in this otherwise dry technical standard

gniparticipants, archivedat http://perma.cc/WD8R-44TU (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
188 GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, DATA BEYOND BORDERS: MUTUAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE IN THE INTERNET ERA 2 (2015),

https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI MLAT Report.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/D76P-XY6A.
19

ETSI DTS 102 677, supra note 165, at 11.

190

Id. at 7.

191

d.
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becomes clear: "[t]he present document assumes the necessary legal
frameworks are in place to allow the use of dynamic triggering in both
single and multiple operator domains. Any legal issues concerning the use
of dynamic triggering are outside the scope of the present document." 1 92 In
other words, technology can only accomplish so much. Beyond that,
countries and individuals must seek a legal framework to justify
surveillance.
III. MLATS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

[80]
As of 2013, the Supreme Court invalidated 176 laws as
unconstitutional. 1 9 3 Against this background Google argues that secrecy
laws surrounding surveillance themselves are illegal on the ground they
violate the First Amendment. 19 4 One part of the government may abuse its
ability to shape and pass laws that provide legal frameworks for agents'
otherwise unlawful behavior. For example, treaties and laws that seek to
allow what would otherwise be unlawful (or unconstitutional) intercept in
the name of lawful intercept.
[81]
MLAT's efforts to legalize reductions to civil liberties have also
been pointed out by others. In 2004, Mark Rotenberg of EPIC 1 9 5 provided
testimony to the U.S. Senate, presenting his work and the work of Gus
Hosein at Privacy International and others on the Budapest Cybercrime

192

id.

193 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 108-17, ACTS OF CONGRESS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2004),

http://www.scribd.com/doc/88307065/Combined-Unconst-Acts, archived at
http://perma.cc/FKU8-7J5J.
194 See, e.g., Julianne Pepitone, Google FilesFirstAmendment Court Case Against NSA
Surveillance Secrecy, CNN (June 18, 2013),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/18/technology/security/google-nsa-first-amendment/,
archived at http://perma.cc/SNY4-QUEP.
195 EPIC Board & Staff, ELEC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (last visited Oct. 30, 2015),
https://epic.org/epic/staff and board.html, archivedat https://perma.cc/6MZY-6PS8.
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196

Treaty.
Rotenberg addressed four broad areas: that the treaty "[1] lacks
adequate safeguards for privacy. . . [2] [has] vague and weak privacy
protections. . . [3] [has] insufficient recognition of international human
rights obligations. . . [and] [4] lacks a dual-criminality requirement."197
He also noted that the work was "drafted in a secret and non-democratic
manner," and "most European countries have failed to ratify" it. 198
Nevertheless, the U.S. did ratify the essentially unchanged treaty three
years later-as did many other countries.199
[82]
At this hearing, prior to the era of disclosures of mass surveillance,
Rotenberg accurately foreshadowed the Snowden disclosures, stating:
We object to the ratification of the Cybercrime Convention
because it threatens core legal protections, in the United
States Constitution, for persons in the United States. The
treaty would create invasive investigative techniques while
failing to provide meaningful privacy and civil liberties
safeguards, and specifically lacking judicial review and
probable cause determinations required under the Fourth
Amendment. A significant number of provisions grant
sweeping investigative powers of computer search and
seizure and government surveillance of voice, e-mail, and
data communications in the interests of law enforcement
196 See CTR. FOR TECH. AND NAT'L SECURITY POL'Y, CROSSCUTTING ISSUES IN INT'L

(Dec. 2009),
http://www.csl.army.mil/SLET/mccd/CyberSpacePubs/What%/"20do%/"2OSenior%/"20Leade
rs%20Need%/o20too2OKnow%/"2OAbout%/"2OCyberspace%/"20by%/"2OJeffrey%/"2OCaton.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/DJ5Y-395U.
TRANSFORMATION

197

See id.

198

Id. at 40-41.

199

Michael A. Vatis, The Council ofEurope Convention on Cybercrime at 209-10,

reprintedin PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBER ATTACKS: INFORMING
STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (2010),

https://cs.brown.edu/courses/cscil950-p/sources/lecl6/Vatis.pdf,
HTTPS://PERMA.CC/26T8-8ZZ2.
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agencies, but are not counterbalanced by accompanying
protections of individual rights or limit on government use
200
of these powers.
[83]
Two years earlier, Hosein and Banisar had warned similarly,
"vague statements about the need to respect those rights . .
will quickly
deteriorate in practice, to the lower common denominator."201 Yet dire as
the analyses of Rotenberg, Hosein, and Banisar were, the Department of
Justice continues to draft MLATs further eroding civil liberties.
A. Judicial Review and Constitutional Supremacy
[84]
In an amicus brief to Boston College Trustees, ACLU of
Massachusetts (ACLUM) summarizes a key MLAT issue: "If the
government has its way, its desired straightjacket on judicial review would
apply to investigations and prosecutions by any foreign country party to an
MLAT[.]" 2 0 2 The doctrine of judicial review and the supremacy of the
Constitution enable access to all civil liberties protections and prevent the
enforcement of unconstitutional laws. We briefly summarize judicial
review here.
[85]
The Constitution does not specifically use the term "judicial
review." The power to declare laws unconstitutional is nevertheless a
long-recognized aspect of the powers given to the Judiciary by Article
III.203

[86]
Essentially, since the Supremacy Clause says "[t]his Constitution"
is the "supreme law of the land," federal statutes are lawful only when
they emanate from the Constitution. State constitutions and statutes are
200

Hearing, supra note 38, at 39.

201

Banisar & Hosein, supra note 172, at 3.
Br. for Ed Maloney, supra note 122, at 15.

202

203 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding the court has power of
judicial review).
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valid only if they are consistent with the Constitution.20 4 Any law contrary
to the Constitution is unlawful. The Supreme Court has final jurisdiction
in all cases arising under the Constitution, so it has the final authority to
decide whether statutes are lawful-that is, consistent with the
Constitution. This is how lawful Intercept (LI) can become Unlawful
Intercept (ULI). Judicial review provides fundamental protection of civil
liberties, and provides a check and balance of power on the Executive and
Legislative, and branches.
[87]
The Executive branch, having invested significant effort in
negotiating MLATs, took the opportunity to expand its own powers and
enable law enforcement goals to work around constitutional restrictions. It
has worked continuously to convince the judicial branch of its lack of
latitude to enforce constitutional protections. A review of Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearings regarding the Cayman Islands MLAT
ironically reveals that leading conservative-and staunch opponent of the
1964 Civil Rights Act-Senator Jesse Helms as the main opponent of the
205
Executive's strategy to reduce civil rights under MLATs.
He introduced
a simple amendment: "To add an understanding that nothing in this treaty
requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of
America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States." 2 0 6 Helms
stated on October 24, 1989:
I have insisted for months and months on end to the State
Department that if clarifications such as I am offering today
were incorporated into the MLAT's [sic], there would be no
problem for me. But I took an oath right here on the floor,
three times, to protect the constitutional rights of the
American people. I do not intend to surrender those rights,

204

See McCullochv. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406 (1819).

205

135 CONG. REC. S13,879-93 (daily ed. Oct 24, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
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207
even inadvertently.

Helms addressed
colleague on the
Helms' opposition
two years.209 Kerry

his remarks to none other than his distinguished
Committee, Senator John Kerry.208 Kerry opposed
to ratifying the treaties and the two battled it out for
stated in the same hearing, conceding Helms's point:

Each of the treaties has an escape clause which permits our
chief law enforcement official, the Attorney General, to
make a determination, if at any time there is some reason to
believe the treaties might be abused, that somehow the
criminal justice process might be diverted by virtue of
corrupt officials in another country or some other possible
barrier to the appropriate use of these treaties, indeed the
United States has the right not to provide information, not
to cooperate under the treaty, as do other countries,
similarly, if they think we are on a fishing expedition. .. . I
understand wholeheartedly the interests that motivate the
distinguished Senator from North Carolina. He has not
sought changes in these treaties because he objects to the
concept of cooperating or fighting the war on drugs. He
has had legitimate concerns about the interests of the
United States and the application of our own Constitution.
I think those concerns have been met in the amendments
we are poised to accept, and I want to thank the
distinguished Senator for his cooperation in helping us to
reach this point.2 10
[88]
2 07

d.

2 08

d.

Helms' wording was eventually accepted in watered-down form.

209 NADELMANN,
210

supra note 114, at 383.

135 CONG. REC., supra note 206.
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Curiously, no courts have reviewed Helms' extensive remarks in
1988-1989 insisting on these protections, Kerry's objections, or the clear
intent of the ultimate adoption of constitutional supremacy. Instead, the
courts over the past 30 years have tended to accept the Justice
Department's assertion that performance is mandatory, and judicial review
is precluded.
[89]
Recently, however, courts have begun to reassert responsibility for
judicial review of MLAT requests, citing separation of powers and the
supremacy of the constitution.2 11 Cases increasingly reflect this struggle,
and seems headed to the Supreme Court for review. The Executive
Branch continues to fight back on efforts to assert judicial discretion
through government appeals.

-

[90]
Recent cases winding their way through the courts appear to be
starting to slowly confront the fundamental constitutional challenges of
MLATs. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling that-while it did not
benefit its hapless subject, Arkadi Gontmakher-did first seem to confront
212
the issue of judicial review.
That case established that MLATs are
- 213
subject to judicial discretion, albeit on a very limited basis.
This built on
a similar Eleventh Circuit holding from 2003, which we review in the Law
214
of the Requested State section.
[91]
Nevertheless, these rulings have been echoed in Trustees of
Boston College, Palmat, and others to support the view that the executive
branch espouses-that MLATs are subject to little or no judicial review.2 15
United States v. Global Fishing (In re 840 140th Ave. NE), 634 F.3d 557, 567-68 (9th
Cir. 2011).
211

212

See id.

213

See id. at 572.

214

See In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003); infra Part III.C.

United States v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 831 F. Supp. 2d 435 (D. Mass 2011) (recognizing
that the Executive's interpretation of treaties are entitled to great weight); Palmat Int'l,
51
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The ACLU of Massachusetts argued in its amicus brief to Boston College
Trustees that "[t]hese cases effectively surrendered judicial review of
foreign requests for evidence in criminal cases to the judgment of the
executive branch. Nothing in the UK-MLAT requires such a result." 2 1 6 A
review of these cases reveals the struggle between the executive and
judicial branches ripe for Supreme Court review.
[92]
The Global Fishing decision-increasingly cited and roundly
criticized by the ACLU-states
[o]ur conclusion that the parties to the treaty intended to
remove the district court's traditional 'broad discretion' does
not end the inquiry. The government argues that, upon
receiving an MLAT request for assistance from the
executive branch, the district court has no choice but to
comply with that request." According to the government,
the constitution imposes no limits on what the executive
217
branch may require the courts to do in that situation.
[93]
We disagree. Treaties, like statutes, are subject to constitutional
limits, including the separation of powers and the guarantee of due
218
process.
[94]

The court goes on to say "[t]he enforcement of a subpoena is an

Inc. v. Holder, No. 12-20229, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2004, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14,
2013).
216
2 17

Br. for Ed Maloney, supra note 122, at 21.

d.

See id. at 571-72 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Am. Ins. Ass'nv. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
416, n. 9 (2003) (holding that treaties are "[s]ubject to the Constitution's guarantees of
individual rights"); cf United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 693 n.8 (holding that in the context
of a § 1782 request, that "[t]he district court's discretion is of course subject to the U.S.
Constitution")).
218
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exercise of judicial power."219 It harshly criticizes the government's
position, stating:
According to the government, the executive branch has the
authority to exercise that power directly, because the
district court is required, by virtue of an MLAT request, to
compel the production of requested documents. The
government's position leads to the inescapable and
unacceptable conclusion that the executive branch, and not
the judicial branch, would exercise judicial power.
Alternatively, the government's position suggests that by
ratifying an MLAT, the legislative branch could compel the
judicial branch to reach a particular result-issuing orders
compelling production and denying motions for protective
orders-in
particular
cases,
notwithstanding
any
concerns-such as violations of individual rights-that a
federal court may have. This too would be unacceptable.2 2 0
[95]
Rulings since Global Fishing have picked up on the Ninth
Circuit's nod to judicial accountability to the constitution, and the
executive branch's opposition. Recently, the First Circuit widened the
crack, opened by the Ninth Circuit, in MLATs' apparently impenetrable
armor by asserting its right to judicial review, but declining to exercise
it.221 In 2013, the First Circuit also found that federal courts have the
authority to quash MLAT subpoenas, but it declined to do so.222
[96]
Between 2000 and 2006, Boston College academics carried out a
project to record oral histories relating to armed domestic strife in Ireland

2 19

22

0

Id. at 572.
id.

221

See In re Price, 685 F.3d at 13.

222

See United Kingdom v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 718 F.3d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 2013).
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in the 1970s between Ireland and the U.K.
A condition of the project
was that Boston College would guard interviewees' confidentiality until
their death, under what it believed and asserted to be an academic
224
privilege conferred by the First Amendment.
Among those oral histories
was testimony by former IRA members Brendan Hughes and Doulours
Price regarding some alleged murders, including that in 1972 of Jean
McConville, a widowed mother of 10 suspected of informing against the
IRA. 225

[97]
In 2011, the U.K. filed a request for the recordings pursuant to its
MLAT, which the U.S. Attorney General duly carried out, seeking and
receiving in 2012 a subpoena directing Boston College to turn over the
recordings. 226 They complied with the first subpoena as it included
interviews with Brendan Hughes, a former Irish Republican Army (IRA)
member who was by then deceased. However, in a second 2012 subpoena,
Boston College was ordered to turn over 85 tapes-including that of the
Doulours Price testimony-to Ireland.2 2 7 Boston College appealed. It
asserted, among other things, that revealing the contents of the recordings
could expose Doulours Price and Boston College academics to acts of
221
violent revenge.
In 2013, the First Circuit ruled against Boston College,
ordering it to turn over additional recordings, including those of Doulours
Price. 2 2 9 Thus, the court handed down a ruling against Boston College-a
disappointment to First Amendment defenders in general, and those
defending academic privilege in particular. The ruling did include a small
223

See id. at 16-17.

224

See id.

225

See id. at 17-18.

226

See id. at 18.
See Trs. ofBos. Coll., 718 F.3d at 18.

227
228

See id.

229

See id. at 27-28.
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silver lining for concerned MLAT-watchers. It merely asserted that the
doctrine of judicial review did not enable the DOJ to unilaterally force
MLAT terms on the judiciary. 2 3 0 This came too late to help Doulours
Price, as she was found dead in her home in January 2013.
The First Circuit noted that Boston College
further urges this court to decide whether a district court
has discretion to quash a subpoena issued pursuant to the
US-UK MLAT.. .. The government, for its part, contends
that courts do not have discretion under the US-UK MLAT
to review for relevance materials subject to a subpoena. It
states that only the Attorney General, not the courts, has
discretion to decline, delay or narrow a request under the
treaty . . . Pursuant to Article 3 of the US-UK MLAT, it is
the Attorney General who decides whether to accede to a
request from the UK, to narrow compliance to a certain
aspect of said request or to decline to cooperate
altogether.2 3 1
[98]
The government, however, erroneously concludes that the
Attorney General's exclusive prerogative in initiating proceedings
translates into a general bar on judicial oversight of the subpoena
enforcement process. The treaty is silent as to the role of federal courts in
the process of enforcing subpoenas issued in furtherance of a request by
the U.K. Of course, this silence does not mean that the actions taken by
the Executive once the Attorney General decides to comply with a request
are totally insulated and beyond the purview of oversight by the courts. In
fact, courts play a prominent role in aiding the Executive's administration
232
of its obligations under the treaty.
In Boston College, the First Circuit
2 30

See id. at 21.

2 31

Id. at 20-21.

232

See 18 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012).
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ruled that
the enforcement of subpoenas is an inherent judicial
function, which, by virtue of the doctrine of separation of
powers, cannot be constitutionally divested from the courts
of the United States. Nothing in the text of the US-UK
MILAT, or its legislative history, has been cited by the
government to lead us to conclude that the courts of the
United States have been divested of an inherent judicial
role that is basic to our function as judges. 2 33
[99] The Court re-emphasizes this throughout the rest of the decision,
noting it has "unequivocally established that courts have inherent judicial
power over the enforcement of subpoenas issued in the context of a
proceeding pursuant to the US-UK MILAT., 234 It expresses withering
criticism of the government's position in footnote 5:
On [one] occasion, the government assumed arguendothat
the discretion to quash existed and that the court acted
properly within it. . . This is in sharp contrast to what the

government had argued unsuccessfully in another case
involving an MLAT where it denied such discretion
existed.. . . In the appeal before us now, the government has
again changed its position...and the guarantee of due
process. 235
[100] Thus, we see the executive branch continuing to pursue the
argument that courts have no discretion over MLAT enforcement, and
enforce the unconstitutional MLAT terms, while the judiciary begins to
push back. Until the court awoke to the direct challenge to its own rights
and authority, it seemed to take a laissez-faire attitude towards protecting
233

See Trs. ofBos. Coll., 718 F.3d at 23.

2 34

d.
Id. at 21 n.5 (internal citations omitted).
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the rights of individuals. Further MLAT challenges are likely to come
before the courts.
[101] Following the decision against Boston College, the government
was not satisfied to have prevailed over academic freedom. The
government petitioned the judge to change his own Boston College
Trustees ruling, to eliminate the very sections in which the court ventured
its assertion of the separation of powers doctrine: "that federal courts have
the authority to quash MLAT subpoenas.",2 3 6
[102]

"Relevant to this inquiry," Boston College's brief responds
Boston College further urges this court to decide whether a
district court has discretion to quash a subpoena issued
pursuant to the US-UK MLAT. The government, for its
part, contends that courts do not have discretion under the
US-UK MLAT to review for relevance materials subject to
a subpoena. It states that only the Attorney General, not the
courts, has discretion to decline, delay or narrow a request
under the treaty.2 37

[103]

Boston College summarizes that the ruling

.

accepted Boston College's argument that federal courts
have authority to quash MLAT subpoenas, and . .
expressly rejected the government's argument that they did
not. The government . . . did in fact address the issue, and
did so in a contradictory fashion that, in the end,
acknowledged federal courts' authority.2 38

Opp'n of Bos. Coll. to Gov't's Pet. for Panel Reh'g at 2, United Kingdom v. Trs. of
Bos. Coll. (In re Price), 718 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2013), http://lettersblogatory.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/gov.uscourts.cal_.12-1236.00106573243.0.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/WJ3J-8WRM.
236

237

See id. at 6.

2 38

Id. at 2.
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[104] Boston College laid out its arguments for judicial review of
MLATs, stating in "its responsive brief in this appeal, the government
acknowledged that it had not appealed from the ruling below that the
district court had authority to quash the US-UK MLAT subpoenas,
explaining that the government 'was satisfied with the result reached by
the district court.',, 2 3 9 Boston College continued that "the government
nonetheless asserted in its responsive brief that the district court had no
discretion to consider Boston College's objections to the subpoena under
either the US-UK MILAT or 18 U.S.C. § 3512, and that the treaty 'reserves
the authority to take these actions [to decline, delay, or narrow the request]
to the Attorney General, not the courts. . . .,,,240 Boston College's brief
quotes the government that "'[t]o the extent courts retain discretion,' that
discretion should be narrowly exercised.,, 2 4 1 To support its argument,
Boston College continues, "the government cited the same Ninth Circuit
decision[GlobalFishing], on which Boston College based its argument in
the district court for that court's authority to quash MLAT subpoenas."2 4 2
[105] Boston College outlined its case for judicial review of MLATs,
citing additional portions of the government's previously filed brief to
show that the United States took a conflicting position regarding the
court's authority to quash MLAT subpoenas earlier in the litigation than
the position taken in the Petition for Rehearing. Boston College quotes
that government brief as stating that while

Opp'n of Bos. Coll. to Gov't's Pet. for Panel Reh'g, supra note 236, at 6. August 22,
2013 the First Circuit issued an errata sheet in response to the United States' August 2nd,
2013 Petition for Rehearing. Both parties briefed the issues raised by the United States'
petition, and the court's errata amendments were incorporated in to the published
239

opinion.
240

Id. (parentheses and emphasis in original).

24

id.

242

id.

1
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this court was 'not require[d]' to address [the authority and
scope of the federal courts' discretion in determining the
legality of an MLAT subpoena] if it did so, 'it is the United
States' position that the district court's discretion is limited
to evaluating whether the issuance of a subpoena would
offend some constitutional guarantee or violate a
recognized federal privilege.2 43
Therefore, Boston College's brief continued,
[i]t is puzzling that the government now seeks in its
Petition for Rehearing a rewriting of this court's opinion to
remove language confirming the authority of federal courts
to quash MLAT subpoenas, when recognition of that
authority is not substantially different from what the
government in its responsive brief said is the 'United
244
States' position' on the issue.
[106] Boston College wryly observes, "[t]his court's decision apparently
describes the nature of the courts' authority in more robust terms than the
government likes. . .. "245 Boston College concludes its arguments against
expunging reference to judicial review of MLATs from the court's
decision by invoking estoppel:
The briefing history in this appeal shows that the
government did have the opportunity to address, and
actually did address, the issue of federal courts' authority to
quash MLAT subpoenas. This history further shows that
the government in its responsive brief did acknowledge that
federal courts have 'discretion' - which presupposes
24 3

Id. at 6-7.

244

Opp'n of Bos. Coll. to Gov't's Pet. for Panel Reh'g, supra note 236, at 7.
id.

24

5
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authority - to quash MLAT subpoenas. This history
requires rejection of the government's request now that the
court rewrite its May 31, 2013 opinion to expunge the
- -246
court's decision on this issue.
[107] Judge Toruella agreed, and long after watchers had assumed the
Boston College case was over, he issued another key ruling. He denied the
government's request that the court essentially revise and expunge the
portion of its own ruling, holding that MLAT subpoenas are subject to
judicial review.2 47 Thus, judicial review of MLAT subpoenas received
recent support from the First Circuit, despite its overall adverse ruling on
other civil liberties in Boston College Trustees.
[108] Rulings since Boston College Trustees have picked up this theme.
Palmat, out of the Southern District of Florida notes the defendants base
their claim in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's protection of an
individual's interests in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters. 2 4 8
For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with
Petitioner's . . . argument . . . [that] the Supreme Court has
observed, treaty obligations are 'subject... to the
Constitution's guarantees of individual rights..
24

6

id.

Order Den. Reh'g, United States v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., No. 12-1236 (1st Cir. Sep. 5,
2013), https://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/category/court-documents-andexhibits/, archivedat https://perma.cc/EE7P-SJXT.
247

Order Granting Resp't Mot. to Dismiss, at 2-3, Palmat Int'l, Inc. v. Holder, No. 1220229, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2004, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) ("Palmat is a Florida
corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. Wellisch is a foreign investor
and Palmat's majority stockholder. In 2010, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
issued several requests to the U.S. Department of Justice for the production of Petitioners'
financial records for bank accounts held in the United States. The requests were made as
part of an ongoing criminal investigation stemming from allegations that Palmat, along
with other companies, paid bribes to Argentine government officials in connection with
the sale of agricultural equipment to the Venezuelan government.").
248
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Therefore, the Court has federal question jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over a claim that a treaty
obligation does not comport with a constitutional
guarantee.2 4 9
B. The Boomerang Effect: MLAT Collateral Impact
[109] Naturally, a hidden risk of MLATs involves the way they may
boomerang back to harm citizens in countries normally enjoying
constitutional protections to their civil liberties. In US v. Trustees of
250
Boston College,
commentators appeared to miss this point.
Conservatives who had never concerned themselves with the possible
fallout of LEA-catering MLATs in the past expressed outrage when the
UK enforced its US MLAT in the recent US v. Trustees ofBoston College
case. In a 2012 press release in New York, the Irish American Republicans
(IAR) condemned "in the strongest terms []the actions of President Barack
Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder in trying to take private
property and invade the private research archives of an American
university, and then turn them over to a foreign intelligence service. 251It
went on to lament, in new-found concern for the rights of the accused:
"[t]he actions of the Obama administration are an utter disgrace, and a
betrayal of the United States Bill of Rights and American national
sovereignty."25 2
See United States v. Moloney, (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal
citation omitted) (exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review an allegation
that the petitioners' First Amendment rights would be violated based on a subpoena
issued pursuant to an MLAT).
249

See generally United Kingdom v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 718 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2013)
(failing to address MLATs).
250

Press Release, Irish-American Republicans, IrishGOP Condems Obama/Holder
MLAT Subpoena of Boston College (Feb. 2, 2012),
https://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/irish-american-republicanscall-for-obamaholder-subpoena-to-be-quashed-in-irish-archives-boston-college-case/
archived at https://perma.cc/G48L-58Z3.
251

252

id.
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[110] The JAR statement complained "Attorney General Holder had
issued subpoenas to Boston College, directing the university to turn over
its extensive research archives on the Irish Troubles to the intelligence
services of the United Kingdom, 'a foreign nation."' 2 5 3 Apparently
ignorant of the compulsory nature of the US-UK MLATs, 2 54 the Obama
administration, the statement said, "had chosen to act pursuant to the
[MLAT] between the US and UK.,, 2 5 5 The First Circuit sided with the
U.K. The release goes on to berate:
The research archives of an American University are
sacred, not to be delivered to foreign despots, by the
government of the United States.. .Nothing could have a
more chilling effect upon America's First Amendment
rights to free speech, right to petition and due process, and
the western tradition of academic freedom, then this
cowardly stunt by the Obama administration to deliver a
private American research archive to a foreign power....
We call upon the United States Court of Appeals, 1st
Circuit, to uphold America's constitutional rights, and
reject the subpoena to Boston College.2 56
[111] Another example of MLAT consequences unforeseen or unheeded
when Congress approved them-as many would characterize Boston

253

id.

Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty, U.S.-U.K., art. I,
1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-2 (1995),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176269.pdf, archivedat
http://penna.cc/WYW3-9XPP.
254

255
25

6

Press Release, supra note 251.
id.
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College-is this collateral damage to freedoms of US citizens.2 5 7 Global
Fishing illustrates this aspect of harm to US citizens from the MLAT's
devil's bargain.25 Russia was the actual party seeking action against a
U.S. citizen in Global Fishing-it sought data regarding Arkadi
Gontmakher, a Seattle businessman and U.S. citizen who was jailed and
eventually tried in Russia on charges that he was involved in the illegal
harvest and sale of king crab. 259 Gontmakher argued that Russia was on a
fishing expedition; in other words, harassing him. 260 His pleading stated
that "the Court should enter a protective order relieving Global [Fishing]
of any obligation to produce documents for use in the Russian
investigation." 261 They contended that the Russian proceedings are corrupt
and illegal in a variety of ways, both in general and with respect to the
specific proceedings against Gontmakher. 262 Apparently, there was
credence to Gontmakher's protests, as he was eventually tried and
acquitted in Russia, and "a Russian judge has ordered the Russian
government to pay 100,000 rubles and apologize to [him]."2 6 3
[112]

Global Fishingillustrates the lack of standing afforded defendants

Sarah Cortes, Legalizing Domestic Surveillance: The Role ofMutual Legal Assistance
Treaties in Deanonymizing TorBrowser Technology (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
257

25

8

id.

See United States v. Global Fishing, Inc. (In re 840 140th Ave.
NE), 634 F.3d 557,
561 (9th Cir. 2011).
259

2 60

Id. at 563.

2 61

Id. at 565.

262

id.

Hal Bemton, Judge: Russia Owes Bellevue Businessman Apology - andRubles,
(Oct. 29, 2012), www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/judge-russia-owesbellevue-businessman-apology-8212-and-rubles/, archivedat http://perma.cc/3MH87AU8.
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SEATTLE TIMES

63

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXII, Issue I

under many U.S MLATs. However, it also illustrates a kind of banking
against the Snowdens of the world-where the U.S may seek a return of
the investment of helping Russia pursue its political enemies in return for
cooperation in apprehending U.S.'s political enemies. Gonhtmakher, by all
indications an innocent victim of Russian extortion, was calculated
collateral damage, readily foreseeable when the treaty was drafted. By
entering into its MLAT with Russia-stripped of civil liberties, especially
in political cases-the U.S. seems to have effectively promised Russia that
the U.S. DOJ will not blink at compulsory MLAT enforcement on behalf
of Russia, even in Russian political cases against U.S. citizens. In return,
we predict the U.S. will expect Russia to one day force Russian
citizens/residents to comply with U.S. demands under the MLAT, when a
Russian resident/citizen-like Snowden, for example-may be target of a
possible U.S. government politically-inspired charge. It would seem that
Snowden-now facing a possibly politically-inspired charge by the U.S.
government, and possibly the death penalty, although now a Russian
resident, two formerly disallowed conditions in MLATs-might fit this
bill exactly.
C. MLATs and the Law of Requested States
[113] In 2003, a decision in a Eleventh Circuit case, In re:
Commissioner's Subpoenas-an appeal from the U.S District Court for the
Southern District of Florida-laid the groundwork for later erosion of civil
26
liberties protections in MLATs.264 The court held in reversing an order
overruling MLAT compliance with a request from Canada regarding
smuggling that "we reject appellee's argument that the 'law of the
Requested State' should be read mechanically to incorporate all of the
substantive law of the Requested State." 2 6 5 Deferring to the Executive
Branch, the court in a single swipe knocked down the application of
precedent to any MILAT treaty requests, sacrificing any protections in our
own country and states in the service of ensuring cooperation with US
264
2 65

In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d at 1290.
d.
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investigations and prosecutions in foreign countries. Referring to the
Technical Analysis-or testimony regarding executive branch intent-the
Court stated "The negotiator's explanation of [the treaty] . . . does not
appear to support the appellees' reading." 2 6 6
[114] The court noted that the treaty Technical Analysis "was prepared
by the United States negotiating team, [and] constitutes the formal
executive branch representations as to the meaning of this treaty and the
obligations to be assumed by the United States under it." 2 6 7 "This official
interpretation by the executive branch is entitled to great deference by this
court," the court goes on to state, apparently less concerned with balancing
deference to U.S constitutionality. 268 It then goes on to note that "the
executive branch states that one purpose of . .. the MLAT, is to "provide[]
slightly broader authority than 28 U.S.C. 1782 for U.S. federal courts to
use their power to issue subpoenas and other process when Canada needs
evidence for use before an administrative agency," 2 6 9 sanctioning further
expansion of Executive power, essentially granting it the ability to modify
U.S. legislation when applying it in a treaty context.
[115] Carter-appointed Circuit Judge R. Lanier Anderson III wrote, "we
conclude that the magistrate judge erred in construing the MLAT to
express a clear and unambiguous intent to make requests under the Treaty
subject to the limitations of all other substantive law of the United
States[.]" Judge Anderson admitted, however, "undeniably, the magistrate
judge's interpretation finds some support in the treaty text." 27 0
D. MLATs and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments-Due Process is Not Applicable to Defendants
2 66

Id. at 1297.

267

Id. (internal citations omitted).

2 68

Id. at 1298.

26

9

2 70

id.
Id. at 1294.
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[116] In many MLATs (notably U.S. MLATs) legal assistance through
MLATs is not explicitly available to defendants.271 For many years, and as
recently as 2015, courts have held that individuals-in other words,
272
defendants-have no right to enforce MLATs.
Others have questioned
whether this exclusion is legal under the due process provisions of the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 273
[ 117] United Kingdom v. United States pitted the U.K. against the U.S.
because the Crown Protection Service (CPS) "apparently pursuant to its
discovery obligations under English law, served Appellants with a
disclosure schedule prepared by the CPS and a British police constable
after a visit to the offices of the US Secret Service in Miami." 2 74 In other
words, the U.K. CPS recognized its obligation to assist defendants and
attempted to use a MLAT on behalf of defendants. The U.S. denied the
claim on the grounds it did not interpret the same MLAT to require the
U.S. to recognize any such defendants' rights.27 5
[118] Alistair Brown notes that there exists the "apparent determination
of some states at least to ensure that individuals cannot invoke treaty
provisions. Again, this is most easily demonstrated under reference to
See, e.g., Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-China, art.
1, June 19, 2000, T.I.O.S. No. 13102. The Agreement states, "[tlhis Agreement is
intended solely for mutual legal assistance between the Parties. The provisions of this
Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of a private party to obtain, suppress or
exclude any evidence or to impede the execution of a request."
271

See, e.g., United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1317 (2001); In re Lavan,
No. MISC-S-11-0019 GEB GGH, 2011 BL 76005, at *2, (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2011).
272

See David Whedbee, FaintShadow of the Sixth Amendment: SubstantialImbalance in
Evidence-GatheringCapacityAbroad under the U.S.-P.R. C. Mutual LegalAssistance
Agreement in CriminalMatters, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 561, 590 (2003).
273

274

United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1315 (2001).

275

See id.
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MLATs negotiated by the USA." 2 7 6 Brown notes
It is accepted that it is open to the defence to enlist the aid
of the court or even of the prosecutor in obtaining evidence
under an MLAT but that is only half the story. In an
adversarial system, the exclusion of evidence obtained
irregularly is, if anything, more important to the defence in
practice than obtaining evidence in support of a substantive
277
defence on the merits.
[119] MLAT partners have a wide variation in their respect for
individual rights and freedoms, which may have inspired signatories to
abandon their citizens' own rights and freedoms in the pursuit of law
enforcement. 27 8 Foreign governments' ability to deprive U.S citizens of
their rights through use of MLATs has increased. In its role as enforcer of
foreign MLAT requests, the U.S actually acts on behalf of the foreign
government in abridging U.S. citizens' rights.
E. MLATs and the Fifth Amendment: MLATs Have No
Double Jeopardy Bar
[120] MLATs have long ignored the rights of individuals to access their
provisions. Newer treaties remove protections routinely included in earlier
MLATs, and further expand LEA scope. According to U.S Department of
Justice documents, there are several benefits to MLATs over other types
of treaties or legal tools.
[121] Brian Pearce, Resident Legal Adviser for the U.S. Embassy in
Bangkok, points out in Mutual LegalAssistance, that "extradition treaties:
double jeopardy is a bar (e.g., US-Thai Treaty Article 5: "If Requested
State has tried fugitive for the same offense, extradition shall not be
276

Brown, supra note 37, at 55.

2 77

Id. at 56.

278

See id. at 55.
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granted.") 279 However, for "MLAT treaties: no such exception [exists]." 28 0
MLATs thus eliminate yet another right afforded under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process clause. In United States v. Jeong, a South
Korean national was convicted in South Korea for paying bribes to
American public officials. He was sentenced to time served-58 days plus
an approximately $10,500 fine. 28 1 The U.S. then requested evidence under
the U.S.-South Korean MLAT, which has no double jeopardy
exclusion. 282 Nevertheless, the U.S. stated it was "not seeking to further
prosecute Jeong," implying it would not put him in double jeopardy for
the crime.2 8 3 The defendant traveled to the U.S., believing he might
receive assistance collecting money that his firm was owed by the agency
he bribed.2 8 4 Upon arrival in the U.S., he was promptly arrested and
285
prosecuted for bribery, wire fraud, and conspiracy. He was sentenced to
five years and a $50,000 fine.2 86 Apparently, the slap on the wrist imposed
by South Korean judicial system did not seem to the DOJ OIA more than
law enforcement theater. Jeong appealed on the grounds that the second
prosecution violated the double jeopardy exclusion of another, multilateral
MLAT. 2 87 The Fifth Circuit ruled against him, holding that no violation
279Brian Pearce, Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

at 21,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/raca/asiaracamlatproces
s.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PRR4-VXMM.
28

0 id.

281

See United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 708-09 (5th Cir. 2010).

See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-S. Kor., Nov. 23, 1993, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 104-1 (1995).
282

283

Jeong, 624 F.3d at 712.

284

Id. at 707.

28 5

Id. at 709.

286

Id. at 710.

287

See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
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occurred-neither of the bilateral nor the multilateral MLAT-and that
double jeopardy does "not attach when separate sovereigns prosecute the
same offense."

288

[122] The U.S-South Korean MLAT-like most U.S. MLATs-omits
any Fifth Amendment provision prohibiting double jeopardy. 289 Thus, the
U.S. prosecuted Jeong twice for the same offense for which he was
convicted in Korea, in a maneuver that would be unconstitutional by
general Fifth Amendment standards-but perfectly permissible under the
MLAT. When applying the MLAT to foreign nationals who admit to
bribery-as Jeong did-this looks like a U.S law enforcement triumph for
the public. The price is that U.S. citizens may be imprisoned and
incarcerated abroad for offenses, for which they have already been tried in
the U.S., including those for which they have been acquitted in a U.S.
court.
F. MLATs and Dual Criminality
[123] Pearce highlights civil liberties rollbacks in other areas. He points
out that "[t]here are several benefits to the MLAT process," noting that
they, "often don't require dual criminality." 2 90 Indeed, a review of MLATs
reveals that dual criminality requirements have quietly disappeared in
recent treaties. For example, Article II, provision 3 of the 2009 US-Canada
MLAT states "[a]ssistance shall be provided without regard to whether the
conduct under investigation or prosecution in the Requesting State
constitutes an offence or may be prosecuted by the Requested State. ,,291
Business Transactions, U.S, Dec. 17, 1997, 105 U.S.T. 43 (ruling that Article 4.3,
referring obliquely to double jeopardy, only required consultation, and then only upon
request).
288

Jeong, 624 F.3d at 712.

289

See id.

290

See Pearce,supra note 279, at 8.

291

See Treaty Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
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[124] But bars to Mutual Legal Assistance are now limited to military
offenses, interference with investigation in the requested state, and tax
offenses (under some treaties). This impact becomes clear when one
considers the many countries with U.S. MLATs where anti-gay laws are
enforced. 2 9 2 Eighteen of these countries have MLATs with the US.293 By
discarding longstanding dual criminality provisions, the many U.S. MLAT
partners now have legal standing to pursue homosexuals, including
demanding U.S. cooperation in their surveillance, apprehension, and
extradition. Many other examples exist of laws in other countries that
effectively criminalize otherwise law-abiding U.S. citizens.2 94
[125] The effects may be difficult to imagine, but include jailing U.S.
citizens-or the citizens of U.S. allies-for homosexuality, assisted by

States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Can., Mar. 18,

1985, Can. T.S. No. 19, http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/traites/entraites-mla-canusa2.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S96J-W9PT [hereinafter US-Can. MLAT]; see
also Treaty Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Ireland
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Ir., Jan. 18, 2001, art. I, para. 3,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/129536.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/KQX4-SE3M [hereinafter US-Ir. MLAT].
292

See Lucas Paoli Itaborahy & Jingshu Zhu, State-SponsoredHomophobia, A World

Survey ofLaws: Criminalisation,Protectionand Recognition ofSame-Sex Love, INT'L

(May 2013),
http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_StateSponsoredHomophobia
archived at http://perma.cc/54ME-NYNR.
GAY BISEXUAL TRANS AND INTERSEX Ass'N

20 13 .pdf,

293 See id. (listing countries with U.S. MLATs that criminalize homosexuality include
Ukraine, Russia, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana,
Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago,
India, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Egypt.).
294

See David M. Herszenhorn, New Russian Law Assesses Heavy Fines on Protesters,

N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/europe/putinsigns-law-with-harsh-fines-for-protesters-in-russia.html?_r-0, archivedat
http://perma.cc/79D8-DJWN.
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MLATs to enlist U.S. LEAs to gather evidence.2 95 Further, they could be
used to assist countries investigating their own nationals while in the U.S.
[126] Consider this scenario: your grandfather, a prominent academic in
India comes to the U.S. as a visiting professor at Harvard for six months.
He attends a rally protesting the election in India, where prominent gay
rights activists also speak. India requests MLAT assistance from the U.S.
LEAs-including Massachusetts State and the Harvard University
police-seeking to prosecute him for the crime of homosexuality. Under
the terms of the MLAT-into which the U.S. entered fully aware India has
crimes on its books like this-the U.S. would have no choice but to assist
in India's investigation of the professor, including possibly turning over
any video of the professor at the rally.
G. MLATs and Political Offenses
[127] Initially, Nadelmann reports, exclusions for political offenses were
included at Dutch insistence when negotiating that 1983 treaty,29 6 much to
the indignation of the Americans. "[W]hen obliged to negotiate such
treaties with non-democratic governments because of broader concerns
such as drug trafficking, U.S. negotiators typically insisted on including
the 'political offense' exception clause." 2 97 However, they saw little need
to include the clause in treaties with Western Europeans, particularly in
MLATs. But "some European negotiators, including the Dutch, were less
convinced that the clause should be excluded; they were influenced by
their own perceptions of the conflicts between civil rights activists and law
enforcement officials in the American South during the 1960's, and by

See Kevin Rawlinson, British Man Jailedfor FourMonths in Morocco for Being
Gay', THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 6, 2014, 7:53 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/british-man-ray-cole-70-jailed-fourmonths-morocco-gay, archivedat http://perma.cc/57N9-Y9SD.
295

296 NADELMANN,
2 97

supra note 114, at 351.
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cases such as that involving the 'Chicago 7.' 298 The American negotiators
took umbrage at any suggestion that violations of U.S. laws-or
prosecutions of criminal offenses-could be politically motivated or
justified; they agreed, however, that insofar as extradition was deemed the
most extreme form of international assistance in criminal cases, a political
offense exception might be warranted in such treaties. However, they saw
no need for its inclusion in the MLAT. When the Dutch insisted, the
Americans relented. 2 9 9 It is worth noting that the Dutch treaty was second
on the U.S. wish list, as Netherlands Antilles was considered to have the
most stringent bank secrecy laws in the world, and thus was a primary
300
haven for money launderers.
[128] Pearce also highlights civil liberties rollbacks in other areas. He
points out "Article 3 of US-Thai Treaty[provides]: 'Extradition shall not
be granted' for political offense[s], military offense[s], or where
'extradition is requested for political purposes,"' however, "MILATs[]
except military offenses, but generally don't exclude political offenses." 3 0 1
For example, the U.S.-Russia MLAT not only did not exclude political
offenses; 302 it appends a note from the U.S. Embassy agreeing it has
303
specifically omitted such during negotiations.
By contrast, the 1994
U.S.-U.K. MLAT 304-used to subpoena the Boston College tapes2 98

2

Id. at 352.

99 id.

300

Id. at 349-50.

301

Pearce, supra note 279, at 20.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Russ., June 17, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No.
302

106-22 (2002).
3 03

Id. at 12.

Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-2 (1996).
304
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excludes assistance that "would be contrary to important public policy" or
relating to "an offence of political character." 305 Interestingly, this MLAT
was used to unjustifiably harass U.S. citizen Arkadi Gontmakher, and
presumably under which the U.S. would in turn pursue assistance
surveilling and prosecuting Edward Snowden.
[129] Some have asserted that the In re Price case is political. 306
According to the U.S.-U.K. MLAT, Mutual Legal Assistance is only
available when the requesting country is "investigating conduct with a
view to a criminal prosecution of the conduct, or referral of the conduct to
criminal investigation or prosecution authorities, pursuant to its specific
administrative or regulatory authority to undertake such investigation." 307
"Assistance shall not be available for matters in which the administrative
authority anticipates that no prosecution or referral, as applicable, will take
place," it states.3 08
[130] In 2014, the BBC reported that years earlier "187 people had
received letters telling them they would not face prosecution for IRA
crimes." 3 0 9 It then emerged that untold hundred had received Royal
pardons for IRA activities. 310 In other words, it appeared the U.K.
at art. III ¶ 1(a), (c).

305

Id.

306

See Br. for Ed Maloney, supra note 122, at 15.

307 ESSENTIAL TEXTS ON INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CRIMINAL

LAw 323 (Gert

Vermeulen ed., 8th ed. 2012).
308 2 INT'L CRIM. L.: MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

486

(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3rd ed. 2008).
John Downey Case 'hasImplicationsfor Northern IrelandDevolution', BBC (Feb.
26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northem-ireland-26345267, archivedat
http://perma.cc/CV9D-GQTC.
309

See Tom Whitehead, EscapedIRA TerroristsHandedRoyal Pardonsas PartofPeace
Deal, Queen had to Sign Off on Mercy Pardonsthat Allowed ConvictedKillers and
Fanaticsto Return to Normal Lives, THE TELEGRAPH, (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/ 10666040/Escaped-IRA310
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government knew all along that it would never prosecute the Jean
McConville murder, nor any other Belfast Project-related crimes, and so
would never comply with the terms of the MLAT.311 It then appeared that
the real aim of the U.K.'s MLAT might have been solely political: raising
the specter of 1972 crimes during an election season which included Sinn
Fein leader Gerry Adams.3 12 Adams was the one Brendan Hughes and
Doulours Price identified as the one who ordered the murder of
McConville and others.3 13

H. MLATs and Death Penalty Bars
[131] Pearce indicates "[e]xtradition treaties often provide there may be
no extradition for offenses which are punishable by death in Requesting
State, but not in Requested State (e.g., Article 6).",314 But for "MLAT
Treaties, no such limitation [exists],"3 15 eliminating a right afforded under

terrorists-handed-Royal-pardons-as-part-of-peace-deal. html, archived at
http://perma.cc/W4VD-9D3A; see also Chris Kilpatrick, Stormont Crisis: Spotlight Falls
on PardonsGranted by Queen to IRA Men Questions Being Asked Over any Other Deals
Cut Behind Closed Doors, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northem-ireland/stormont-crisis-spotlight-fallson-pardons-granted-by-queen-to-ira-men-30046304.html, archivedat
http://perma.cc/S9XJ-Z5AV.
See Conor Macauley, Boston College Preparedto Return Troubles Tapes, BBC (May
6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northem-ireland-27286543, archivedat
http://perma.cc/TX6J-K35W.
311

See BC Archive Case Appears PoliticallyMotivated, THE IRISH ECHO (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://irishecho.com/2011/10/bc-archive-case-appears-politically-motivated/, archived at
http://perma.cc/S2SP-ZUMD.
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313

See id.

314

Pearce, supra note 279, at 22.
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d.
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the Eighth Amendment.3 16 Nineteen states outlaw the death penalty.3 17
But U.S. MLAT drafters, reviewers, and approvers see fit to collaborate to
facilitate investigation and prosecution in situations where the penalty in
the requesting country will be terminal.
[132] For instance, "country surveys . . . indicate that apostasy laws are
frequently used to charge persons for acts other than conversion. For
example, in Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen, individuals
were charged with apostasy for their writings or comments on social
media." 318 Salman Rushdie and others were sought for criminal
prosecution (and punishment by death) by the Iranian state for ostensibly
criticizing Islam.319 As another example, in many Islamic countries, laws
require women to wear hijab.32 0 Under the terms of this MLAT with
321
Iran,
it appears India may have agreed to assist Iran in pursuing women
316

U.S.

317

See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY

CONST.

amend. VIII.
INFO. CTR.,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty, archivedat
http://perma.cc/4U62-BVWQ (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
31

id.

319

Barbara Crossette, Iran DropsRushdie Death Threat, And Britain Renews Teheran

8

Ties, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/04/18/secials/rushdie-drops.html, archivedat
http://perma.cc/8BGD-7RP3.
320 Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic ofIran - Book Five, Chapter Eighteen,
Article 638, IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS Doc. CTR. (July 18, 2013),

http://iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-documents/iranian-codes/ 1000000351-islamic-

penal-coe-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-book-five.html# 18, archived at
http://perma.cc/G964-YZ7F (explaining that a hijab is a full set of garments for women
only, that can cover the entire body, including eyes, face, head, arms, hands, legs, and
feet. Some states assert that a hijab is required under Islamic law, while others disagree.
The Qu'ran does not explicitly require hijab, but includes an exhortation for women to
cover themselves).
321

Gov'T

OF INDIA MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS: POL'Y PLANNING

Div.,
http://mha.nic.in/Policy PlaningDivision, archivedat http://perma.cc/7QJX-W34V (last
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under its jurisdiction, not dressed according to Iran's tastes.
I. MLATs and Search, Seizure, and Online Surveillance
[133] We have reviewed MLATs' lack of Fifth, Sixth, Eight, and
Fourteenth Amendment protections. The section on U.S. DOJ motivation
to achieve MLAT performance certainly revolved around search and
seizure, an area generally subject to Fourth Amendment protections. In its
amicus brief in Boston College Trustees, the ACLUM summed up the
issue: "ACLUM is concerned about the government's position in this case
that governments who are parties to Mutual Law Assistance Treaties
should have greater rights than United States federal and local law
enforcement authorities to subpoena documents without judicial
review.", 3 2 2 This case reflected public outcry in the U.S.-particularly
among Irish-Americans and friends of academic freedom-about the
request by the U.K. to seize recordings of oral histories of IRA
members.3 2 3 The heart of that outcry concerned public realization and
disbelief that MLATs lack Fourth Amendment protections, or that judicial
review and relief regarding these protections is unavailable to them.

J. MLATs and Wiretapping
[134] The Wiretap Act bases its search and seizure protections in Fourth
Amendment judicial review requirements and probable cause
determinations.32 4 Modern MLATs eliminate these obstacles for LEAs. By
visited Dec. 3, 2015) (stating "India has so far operationalised these Treaties with the
following 34 countries [...] Iran").
322

Br. for Ed Maloney, supra note 122, at 7-8.

323

United States v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 831 F. Supp. 2d 435, 455 (D. Mass. 2011).

324 See, e.g., U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. § 1); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of
1994, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. § 1001).
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eliminating constitutional constraints on search and seizure-including
that of personal data and communications under government
surveillance-MLATs, when applied to Americans, expose them to an
unfamiliar lack of civil liberties.
[135] In United States v. Rommy, the Second Circuit established that the
United States government may conduct investigations (including
surveillance) outside MLATs. 325 Pursuant to MLAT requests from the
U.S. in 2002, "the Netherlands provided the United States with a transcript
of a . . . call intercepted by the Dutch police in which Rommy and an

unnamed confederate discussed the limited supplies of 'Versace tshirts."' 3 26 "Rommy contended that the DEA violated the MLAT in effect
between the United States and the Netherlands-as well as Dutch
domestic law-by employing a confidential informant (DeVries) to gather
evidence in the Netherlands after Dutch officials had denied the United
States' MLAT request to conduct an undercover investigation in their
country. ,,27 The judge held an MLAT procedure is nice but not necessary,
and denied the motion to reverse the ultimate conviction on this, and all
other grounds.328
[136] In this case, the Dutch courts actually denied the first MLAT
request for surveillance of Rommy for lack of probable cause.32 9 In similar
cases, when the legal shoe is on the U.S. foot, the U.S. Attorney General
and U.S. Courts have claimed MLATs preclude such refusals. 330 Not to be
325

See United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 140 (2d Cir. 2007).

3 26

Id. at 113.

3 27

Id. at 128.

3 28

Id. at 128-31.

3 29

Id. at 113.

See, e.g., United States v. Moloney (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1, 11-14 (1st Cir. 2012)
(holding that two subpoenas in an investigation of two academic researchers were not
precluded from disclosure under MLAT); see also United States v. Under Seal (In re
77
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deterred, the U.S. conducted its own investigation of Rommy in the
Netherlands.3 3 1 On the grounds of evidence thus gathered in disregard of
the agreed-upon MLAT procedure, the Netherlands relented upon a
second MLAT request from the U.S., and agreed to allow Rommy's
-332
surveillance.
K. MLATs and FOIAs
[137] Even the FOIA has not survived MLATs. A report submitted to the
Senate by Senator Jesse Helms on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee stated "[m]ost MLATs allow the Central Authorities of the
country providing evidence or information under the Treaty to prohibit its
use in other investigations, prosecutions, or proceedings without their
consent. . . . In this country, the limitation places the MLAT information
and evidence initially beyond the reach of a Freedom of Information Act
request." 3 33

L. MLAT and International Law
[138] Before reviewing surveillance and Fourth Amendment issues, we
briefly review contraventions to international law. With respect to
international privacy treaties and MLATs, we find a disconnect between
MLAT treaty provisions and privacy protections in other treaties. For
example, the 1966 U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the 1953 COE European Convention on Human
Grand Jury Subpoena), 646 F.3d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that MLAT did not
give a private right of action to protect subpoenas, regarding documents in discovery
between two companies, from government investigation).
331

See Rommy, 506 F.3d at 113.

332 id.

S. ExEc. REP. No. 106-24, at 6 (2000), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT106erpt24/pdf/CRPT-106erpt24.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/5QS8-GLTB.
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Rights (ECHR) are two treaties considered to bear on privacy
internationally. 3 34 But their terms-like those of other treaties and lawshave never been applied to MLATs.
[139] The European Parliament noted in its 2014 report its
disapprobation of U.S. stance that non-U.S. citizens may be accorded a
sort of second-class status with respect to civil liberties accorded its own
citizens, as in MLATs:
[I]n respect of intelligence activities concerning non-US
persons under Section 702 of FISA, the Recommendations
to the President of the USA recognise the fundamental
principle of respect for privacy and human dignity as
enshrined in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Article 17 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights . . . whereas we find [the U.S.
government] does not recommend granting non-US persons
the same rights and protections as US persons.33 5
The report also notes the threat U.S. mass surveillance poses. It states:
these risks [to liberty] do not only originate in criminal
activities (against which the EU legislator has adopted a
series of instruments) or from possible cyber attacks from
governments of countries with a lower democratic record.
1953 Council of Europe's European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), art. 8,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/8T7N-EK9U; 1966 U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), art. 17,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%/"20999/volume-999-1-14668English.pdf, archivedat https://perma.cc/67U4-SG78.
334

Report on the U.S. NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various
Member States and their Impact on EU Citizens'FundamentalRights and on
TransatlanticCooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, at 10 (Feb. 21, 2014),
335

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A72014-0139+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN, http://perma.cc/3GSW-G7X3.
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There is a realization that such risks may also come from
law enforcement and intelligence services of democratic
countries putting E.U. citizens or companies under conflicts
of laws resulting in a lesser legal certainty, with possible
violations of rights without proper redress mechanisms. 3 3 6
[140] With respect to MLATs, the report observes their recognized role
in acquiring information:
Calls on the Commission to conduct . . . an in-depth
assessment of the existing Mutual Legal Assistance
Agreement . . . in order to verify its practical
implementation and, in particular, whether the US has
made effective use of it for obtaining information or
evidence in the EU and whether the Agreement has been
circumvented to acquire the information directly in the EU,
and to assess the impact on the fundamental rights of
individuals; such an assessment should not only refer to US
official statements as a sufficient basis for the analysis but
also be based on specific EU evaluations.33 7
Finally, specific privacy protections in MLATs are few and far
between, and precede the modern era of digital communications. For
example, Article 26 of the E.U. MLAC refers to data protection. 3 3 8
However, the protections there are vague, especially compared with the
provisions for LEAs. In conclusion, U.S. citizens and others seem to have
been deprived of a full range of civil liberties through Executive Branch
action, through what it maintains is compulsory international treaty
reflexivity.

3 36

Id. at 4.

3 37

Id. at 28.

338

See EU MLAC, supra note 145, at art. 13.
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IV. MLATS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR SURVEILLANCE
[141] Mutual Legal Assistance is certainly a critical element to a civil
society, as is surveillance. Victims and targets of crime will be the first to
seek to take advantage of MLAT capabilities, and will demand that law
enforcement worldwide spare no effort to investigate, survey, apprehend,
and arrest criminals. Certainly MLATs and surveillance have a legitimate
role to play as a tool to improve law enforcement-no less, of course, than
do privacy- and anonymity-protecting MJAT tools like Tor Browser,
extensively used by law enforcement. Yet laws and legal tools that fail to
replicate privacy and other civil protections can cause harm, as well as
reduce security. MLATs create legal frameworks that can be used to
justify surveillance that is otherwise Unlawful Intercept. We briefly
review case law, including very recent cases that have upheld these legal
frameworks. We use the term Unlawful Intercept ("ULI")-meaning
unconstitutional surveillance-to contrast with Lawful Intercept ("LI"),
itself a synonym for government surveillance.
A. MLAT Explicit References to Surveillance
[142] We have reviewed numerous treaties in Section Two that explicitly
incorporate reference to telecommunications and data surveillance with
weak safeguards, or where drafters testified that this was their intent. As
we have seen in In re Commissioner's Subpoenas-the Canadian
smuggling case-not only the explicit treaty provisions, but also their
intent forms the legal basis for later review in the courts.3 39 We recall
Judge Anderson's words: "The negotiators' explanation of [the treaty],
provided in the Technical Analysis, does not support the appellees'
reading." 3 4 0
[143] The U.S. Senate hearing testimony by Mary Ellen Warlow-the
Director of the Office Of International Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice-explains how the desire for legal justification for
339
34 0

See generally In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1297.
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.

surveillance motivated not only the U.S., but also Germany in drafting
recent MLATs. She said "this is the first United States MLAT to include
. . telecommunications surveillance. . . . This provision was included at
Germany's request, to assert the Federal government's legal authority, visa-vis the States, to undertake such actions on behalf of foreign
authorities. , 3 4 1 The testimony of Samuel M. Witten-Deputy Legal
Adviser for the U.S. Department Of State-further established intent, by
saying "[t]he proposed U.S.-Germany Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in
Criminal Matters (MLAT). . . has several innovations, including
telecommunications surveillance[. ]342
[144] We have already reviewed detailed surveillance provisions in
specific treaties in Section Two. We now review how other MLAT
provisions add to the legal basis for surveillance.

B. Spontaneous Information
[145] "The US National Security Agency circumvents UK law by
offering, rather than being asked for, intelligence from global websites to
their British counterparts, according to David Blunkett, who was home
secretary at the time of the 9/11 attacks," according to a 2013 report by the
Guardian, which further states ". . .Blunkett highlighted one of the key
areas at the heart of investigations into whether Britain's GCHQ
ConcerningLaw Enforcement Treaties: Hearingon Law Enforcement TreatiesBefore
the S. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 109th Cong. 10, (2005) (statement by Mary Ellen
Warlow, Director, Office of Int'l Affairs, Dep't of Justice),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87297.pdf, archivedat
http://perma.cc/462C-PJ3P.
341

On an Extradition Treaty with GreatBritain and Northern Ireland, an Extradition
Protocolwith Israel, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Germany, and a Mutual
LegalAssistance Treaty with Japan:Hearing on Law Enforcement TreatiesBefore the S.
Comm. oOn Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 10, (2005) (statement by Samuel M. Witten,
Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't Of State), http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87190.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/LQ9M-5L7.
342

82

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXII, Issue I

eavesdropping centre has abided by the law." 343 Exactly what law,
however, was not clear. However, an examination of the Budapest
Cybercrime Treaty may finally clear up this question. That treaty
enshrines in law the idea that countries just help each other out,
unsolicited:
A Party may, within the limits of its domestic law and
without prior request, forward to another Party information
obtained within the framework of its own investigations
when it considers that the disclosure of such information
might assist the receiving Party in initiating or carrying out
investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences
established in accordance with this Convention or might
lead to a request for cooperation by that Party under this
chapter.344
[146] According to Article 26, the provision appears to be custom-made
to fit into the US "international silver platter doctrine,"34 5 which courts
have been using to uphold what would otherwise amount to violations of
the Fourth Amendment. The Budapest Cybercrime Treaty states:

Nicholas Watt, NSA 'offers intelligence to British counterpartsto skirt UK law', THE
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2013),
343

http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jun/10/nsa-offers-intelligence-britishcounterparts-blunkett, archivedat http://perma.cc/W3FK-VCKW.
344

Budapest Cybercrime Treaty, supra note 75, at art. 26.

International silver platter doctrine, which holds that allowed evidence seized illegally
by agents other than U.S. Federal agents, i.e. foreign law enforcement, may be admitted
in U.S. federal court as long as the foreign officials were not acting as agents of federal
law enforcement. The court reasons that foreign agents are not deterred by the
exclusionary rule, and evidence handed to U.S. federal agents "on a silver platter" may be
admitted. This theory was discredited and thrown out after 50 years of misuse in the US
courts pertaining to evidence obtained illegally by domestic police, i.e. state and local
police. Yet it lives on as a Fourth Amendment exception for foreign police evidence. See
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (plurality opinion).
345
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Prior to providing such information, the providing Party
may request that it be kept confidential or only used subject
to conditions. If the receiving Party cannot comply with
such request, it shall notify the providing Party, which shall
then determine whether the information should nevertheless
be provided. If the receiving Party accepts the information
subject to the conditions, it shall be bound by them.34 6
[147] This provision sounds highly familiar. It is in fact a review of
parallel construction,34 with its imperative to keep the real source of
information-unlawful surveillance-a secret. We discuss the Silver
Platter Doctrine after a review of JITs.
C. JITs and Collaborative Surveillance
[148] The EU MLAC first provided for Joint Investigative Task Forces
(JITs) in 2000.
JITs bring together members of law enforcement from
346

Budapest Cybercrime Treaty, supra note 75.

347

See Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 49.

See, e.g., EU MLAC, supra note 145, at art. 13; see also Summaries ofE. U.
legislation- Mutual assistancein criminalmatters between Member States, EUR-LEX
348

EUROPA,

http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/justicefreedom security/judicialcooperation in
criminal matters/133108 en.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/75X6-BTXA (last updated
Dec. 20, 2011). JITs originate in more than one source. We cite the principal sources,
without going further into the history. Europol, the European Union Police Alliance
website also provides background. General Legal Basisfor JITs, EUROPOL,
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/general-legal-basis-jits, archived at
https://perma.cc/4VHW-NT3B ("Joint Investigation Teams [are] provided for in Article
13 of the 2000 MLA Convention.") (last visited Dec. 3. 2015); E.U.-U.S. MLAT, supra
note 75, at art. 5. While established in the 2000 Act, JITs did not actually commence until
2005. Thus, the E.U.-U.S. MLAT can also be considered to be the origination point for
JITs. Confusingly, this treaty did not enter into force (EIF) until 2010. Its drafting,
signing, ratification and entry into force spanned seven years, which is not unusual for
treaties. Thus, while its initial draft preceded the actual formation of JITs in 2005, and
thus can be considered the origin of JITs, its final EIF followed that of the E.U. MLAC.
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multiple countries. Article 13, Provision 7 states:
Where the joint investigation team needs investigative
measures to be taken in one of the Member States setting
up the team, members seconded to the team by that
Member State may request their own competent authorities
to take those measures. Those measures shall be considered
in that Member State under the conditions which would
apply if they were -requested in a national investigation. 349
[149] Thus, for example, if a U.S. LEA is the originating Member State,
it can request to set up a JIT in France, with members "seconded" from
France, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Jamaica. Thus, a U.S. case can become a
French, Croatian, Bulgarian, and Jamaican case. When the U.S. ultimately
seeks surveillance data about a U.S. citizen in Jamaica, that would under
U.S. law be prohibited domestic surveillance. However, once it forms a
JIT with Jamaica, it also becomes a Jamaican case. In seeking surveillance
data about a U.S. citizen, Jamaica is free to surveil the U.S. national as a
foreign citizen. The JIT then allows Jamaica to share the resulting
surveillance with the rest of the JIT members, including the U.S. LEA.
E.U. MLAC Provision 9 states:
A member of the joint investigation team may, in
accordance with his or her national law and within the
limits of his or her competence, provide the team with
information available in the Member State which has
seconded him or her for the purpose of the criminal
investigations conducted by the team.3 50
[150] JITs come to mind when reflecting on The Guardian's report from
2013, that reports "[t]he US National Security Agency circumvents UK
law by offering, rather than being asked for, intelligence from global
349

EU MLAC, supra note 145, at art. 13, para. 7.

3 50

Id. at art. 13, para. 9.
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websites to their British counterparts, according to David Blunkett.", 3 51 In
this way, MLAT JITs facilitate cooperative surveillance by collaborating
governments. In other words, they legalize formerly Unlawful Intercepts.
In Getto I, the court held
ongoing collaboration between an American law
enforcement agency and its foreign counterpart in the
course of parallel investigations does not-without
American control, direction, or an intent to evade the
Constitution-give rise to a relationship between the two
entities sufficient to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained abroad by foreign law enforcement.3 5 2
[152] The Court also held "the alleged warrantless searches and
surveillance do not shock the judicial conscience.
What does shock the
conscience is that-considering of the facts of the investigation-the
Court could have found an absence of "American control, direction, or an
intent to evade the Constitution."3 5 4

D. International Silver Platter Doctrine
[153] The Silver Platter doctrine fits precisely into the Spontaneouscooperation clause of the Budapest Cybercrime Treaty and into the JIT
provisions of that and most other modern MLATs. In 2014, the Second
Circuit issued its second and final ruling in United States v. Getto.3 55
351

Watt, supra note 343.

352

United States v. Getto (Getto 1), 729 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2013).

353

id.

3 54

355

d.
United States v. Getto (Getto II), 586 Fed. App'x 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2014).
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There, the court demonstrated its determination to turn a blind eye to the
reality of U.S. MLAT influence over foreign LEAs and the example it sets
in the world by upholding the admissibility of evidence-specifically,
surveillance-legally gathered under MLATs, despite court findings that
the evidence was gathered illegally by many other standards.35 6 In Getto I,
an American citizen appealed his conviction in a case involving
surveillance of a "lottery telemarketing scheme operated out of three socalled 'boiler rooms"' in Israel.35 7 The court insisted that Israeli LEAs are
not agents of U.S. LEAs. 3 5 8 This reasoning is echoed in the decision in
United States v. Lee, when U.S. LEA purchased surveillance equipment
for a Jamaican LEA, provided their training in its use, and in other ways
might have been seen to have "directed" the operation. 3 59 This might
violate U.S. law prohibiting seeking methods "designed to evade
constitutional requirements." 36 0
[154] Not so, found Judge Jose A. Cabranes of the Second Circuit, the
judge in both cases. U.S. LEAs did not "direct" searches and seizures in
361
these cases.
In contrast with the finding in Elkins v. UnitedStates that
ended the domestic silver platter exception to the Fourth Amendment,3 6 2
Cabranes' rulings appear to demonstrate that over 50 years later-despite
it being a different world where crime is internationalized-U.S. judges
are not prepared to acknowledge constitutional evasion maneuvers called
out years before by their colleagues. The court "reason[ed] that 'the mere
35

6

id.

357

Getto I, 729 F.3d at 225.

3 58

Id. at 230-31.

359

United States v. Lee, 723 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2013).

3 60

Id. at 140.

3 61

Id. at 139.

Id. at 139 n. 3 (distinguishing domestic silver platter with international silver platter
doctrine).
362
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fact that an [MLAT] existed, information was shared and the DEA
provided money, training and [surveillance] equipment does not warrant a
finding of agency' between the DEA and Jamaican law enforcement.",3 6 3
The court found "the two nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding
("MOU") in 2004 to establish a program in which Jamaican law
enforcement officers, inter alia, 'would monitor intercepted phone
conversations authorized by Jamaican court orders for purposes of both
countries gathering
evidence or leads to obtain evidence in narcotics
364
investigations."'
[155] In Getto I, the court held that Israeli LEAs are not acting as
"agents" of U.S. LEAs, even when the U.S. LEA purchased surveillance
equipment for the foreign LEA and, as in United States v. Lee, provided
*
365
their training in its use, and in other ways directed the investigation.
Getto pointed out that "(1) the INP initiated its investigation based on the
MLAT request from American law enforcement officials; (2) Israel never
sought to prosecute Getto; (3) many other members of the conspiracy, or
related conspiracies, were extradited to the United States; and (4) an
article in an Israeli newspaper stated that American law enforcement
agents watched live surveillance of the Ha'Negev boiler room."3 66 The
court found that "the MLAT request, the information-sharing between
American law enforcement and the INP, and American receipt of the fruits
of the INP's investigation in Israel - reveals no cooperation 'designed to
evade constitutional requirements."' ]Thus, it reasoned that the evidence
need not be excluded, and upheld Getto's conviction.3 6 7 The court found
that Israeli LEAs are not acting as agents of U.S. LEAs, despite

3 63

Id. at 138.

364

Lee, 723 F.3d at 137.

365

Getto I, 729 F.3d at 231.

3 66

Id. at 230.

3 67

Id. at 234-35.
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appearances to the contrary.368 Getto also asserted the Israeli National
Police acted as agents under the joint venture doctrine, a doctrine which
the Second Circuit does not recognize and explicitly declined to adopt in
369
this case.
E. JITs and the European Parliament
[156] Regarding JITs, the European Parliament reported as a result of its
investigation 370 that "the revelations since June 2013 have caused
numerous concerns within the EU as to...
the degree of cooperation and involvement of certain EU
Member States with US surveillance programmes or
equivalent programmes at national level as unveiled by the
media; the lack of control and effective oversight by the US
political authorities and certain EU Member States over
their intelligence communities; the possibility of these mass
surveillance operations being used for reasons other than
national security and the fight against terrorism in the strict
sense, for
example economic and industrial espionage
or profiling on political grounds; . . . the respective roles
and degree of involvement of intelligence agencies and
private IT and telecom companies; the increasingly blurred
boundaries between law enforcement and intelligence
activities, leading to every citizen being treated as a suspect

3 68

36

9

Id. at 230-32.
id.

EU Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, EuropeanParliamentReport
on the US NSA surveillanceprogramme, surveillance bodies in variousMember States
and their impact on EU citizens'fundamentalrights and on transatlanticcooperation in
Justice and Home Affairs, art. F (2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A72014-0139+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN, archived at http://perma.cc/A7BN-GE7M.
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and being subject to surveillance[.] 371
[157] Reuters first reported the concept of parallel construction in
2013.372 It is a short step from using JIT cooperative surveillance to using
JITs to facilitate legal window dressing for parallel construction.
F. Value of Measuring MLATs and Lawful Intercept in an
Era of Unlawful Intercept
[158] We now briefly pause to examine the value of LI indicators in an
era of covert mass global surveillance. Given revelations that GIAs around
the world perform surveillance unconstrained by laws, is there anything to
learn from analyzing the indicia of each country's LI propensity, such as
MLATs?
[159] The nature of government surveillance is covert. By contrast, it
would seem MLATs are overt (albeit very low profile) tools, which may
legalize otherwise unconstitutional global surveillance cooperation. As so
many GIAs seem to be conducting Unlawful Interception, a fatalist and
cynic might take the view that that there is no longer any reason to expend
effort either negotiating or using MLATs. One might argue if all
intelligence is already covertly available to all law enforcement through
NSA programs, why bother with MLATs at all? Yet indisputably, MLAT
use continues to expand and proliferate.
[160] There are six good reasons why MLAT analysis and analysis of
Lawful Intercept in general is legitimate, despite the fact that un-lawful
intercept continues apace globally. First, MLATs indicate a need for legal
grounds for surveillance by high-MLAT-initiating countries, like
37
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Canada. 3 Second, they are indicators of prevalence of surveillance
targets and collaborators in countries where MLATs cluster, like tiny
Cook Islands. 3 Third, not all GIAs from the same country share
intelligence data. Thus, LI demonstrably expands surveillance and its
measure remains relevant regardless of ULI. Fourth, LI may supplement
ULI where GIA's reach is incomplete or unattainable (if such a thing is
still possible). Fifth, reliable and significant datasets exist for LI, while
few exist for ULI, and the ones that do exist are incomplete and unreliable.
So far, no successful attempts to create a trust model based on ULI exist.
Sixth, LI country analysis can be viewed as a complement to ULI analysis
rather than a substitute.
[161] In terms of the value of MLATs as general surveillance indicators,
MLATs can provide legal cover for surveillance by nations that consider
themselves law-abiding.
While in rogue nations conducting
surveillance, the lack of MLATs may not accurately indicate surveillance
activity, this does not detract from the fact that MLATs-in combination
with other
hostility indicators 376-- -can provide an overall indication of
countries' surveillance traffic and collaboration policies.
[162] Second, analyzing MLATs can shed light on where activity of
interest to GIAs may be occurring. For example, the Cook Islandsthousands of miles from anywhere-has approximately 150 treaty
relationships. 3 The indicator of activity of interest in this small,
ocean-bound nation can indicate something of interest to LI is occurring,
373

See In Depth, supra note 62.

374 See id.
375 See id.
376

See id.

COOK ISLAND Gov'T, Treaty Database:InternationalTreaties,
http://www.mfai.gov.ck/index.php/treaty-database.html, archivedat
http://perma.cc/K8LN-V44Z (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
377

91

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXII, Issue I

whereby it might be logical to conclude the investment of time to establish
a legal basis for surveillance has had some justification in the surveillance
conducted there.
[163] Third, parallel construction has laid bare that not all GIAs share
intelligence. Thus, the NSA's "poor step-siblings" (who must follow the
rule of law) demonstrate that for many GIAs, LI-facilitated by tools such
as MLATs-clearly expand surveillance, and so still matter.37 8
[164] Fourth, even the most powerful GIA may not have the ability to
control online data everywhere in the world, at least not without difficulty.
LI provides an additional vector for surveillance beyond where even ULI
cannot reach.
[165] Fifth, ULI data (as we have pointed out) is sparse, incomplete, and
lacking in credibility. Clearly the optimal surveillance dataset would track
all GIAs the world over and score countries by degree of online
government surveillance. However, despite diligent effort reviewing
existing sources, we (unsurprisingly) remain unaware of a reliable and
complete dataset classifying GIA activity for countries around the world.
Thus, comparing countries may be impossible on a practical basis, without
analyzing what information legally justified LI data can provide.
V. MLATS AND

JURISDICTIONAL ARBITRAGE

[166] Having now laid the legal groundwork to understand the
motivations and effects of modem MLATs and their role in surveillance,
we turn to their application in attacks on online privacy and anonymity
tools like Tor. Earlier, we defined MJATs as a class of online
multi-jurisdictional, anonymity/privacy tools-including virtual private
networks ("VPNs"), proxy servers, and anonymous networks-have
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andADS-B in up to Date Surveillance Systems, Int'l Sci. Conference New Trends in
Aviation Development 2014, http://www.researchgate.net/publication/271825731,
archived at http://perma.cc/WV9L-CBAF.
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emerged. Examples include JonDos, 37 12P, 38
UltraSurf, 383 TorBrowser. 3 8 4 For TorBrowser, we
since 2004 to an average of over 2.5 million
peaking as high as six million users on high usage
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Freenet, 38 Lantern, 38
noted usage has jumped
daily users worldwide,
days.38 5

[167] MJATs have many uses, and in one way can be thought of as
online counter-surveillance tools. The hypothetical American journalist
and the Australian whistleblower used Tor to evade government
surveillance. Many MJATs use them simply to evade corporate
marketing-driven surveillance. In In Depth: MJA T Jurisdictional
Arbitrage Measurement and Technical Experiments,386 we review this
topic in greater detail, including the mechanics of MJATs, and show how
MLATs can be used in their attack. MLATs increase the risk of
"breaking" online anonymity tools by allowing countries to collaborate in
piecing together encrypted network traffic as it travels through disparate
jurisdictions. Anonymity networks such as Tor intentionally route network
packets through geographically dispersed checkpoint routers, in order to
obfuscate the Internet address and location of the user's device and their
destination website.38 7 This increases the likelihood that user traffic will
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travel across multiple legal and other jurisdictions.
A. Legal Threats to Global Online Anonymity Networks: ISPs
and IXPs
[168] New adversarial models are necessary to take into account global
surveillance and that different governments may pose different,
quantifiable risk to anonymous network communications. First, we rank
countries by number and nature of intelligence treaties. Second, we bring
to light MLAT cartels-groups of cooperating countries. Finally, we
demonstrate interlocking cartels can function as super-cartels through
legal mechanisms such as JITs. Combined with other measurable hostility
factors, we demonstrate a method by which GIA risk per country can be
quantified. We show that MLATs are one of several hostility factors or
indicators, which governments can display to anonymous network
communications.
[169] Researchers have considered technical attacks against networks,
including online anonymity networks. We consider legal attacks against
ISPs and IXPs; that is, attacks by governments with legal jurisdiction and
control over ISPs and IXPs. In this article, we consider a threat model of
local passive adversaries, personified in the form of each of the 191
autonomous governments of the world, based on the ISO 3166 standard.
In this model, adversary governments take control in varying degrees of
the ability to read online communications traffic flowing over the web as it
passes through their own countries, through Internet Service Provider
("ISP") and Internet Exchange Point ("IXP") cables and devices located in
their country.
[170] In what jurisdictions do the IXP and ISP lie? In other words, which
countries' governments control parts of the path through which your
network traffic flows? Do those countries recognize the same standards for
privacy as those in the user's home country? Are they more or less

2500102.pdf, archived at http://penna.cc/76H2-L67T.
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respectful of individual privacy of online communications, including
anonymous online communications? What laws exist in those countries, to
protect privacy? And, what actual practices exist, regardless of laws?
B. MLAT Attacks: MLATs as an Indicator of Hostility to
Privacy
[171] In addition to the matters herein discussed, we build upon the
impacts of MLATs in a set of other publications. The use of expanded
MLATs has become an indicator of legal hostility to freedom. Countries
with a greater number of MLATs indicate their willingness to cooperate in
erosion of constitutional freedoms, including intercepting network traffic.
In JurisdictionalArbitrage,3 88 we identify and define MLAT hostility
indicators and other legal hostility factors, and measure the countries of
the world by these factors. We explore the implications for anonymous
network communications in a series of experiments. We introduce the
global MLAT map, the first of its kind. We present our results and
conclusions for online privacy tools and attacks through the law. We have
identified five hostility factors that indicate a government's
legally-encoded hostility to privacy of online communications. 3 89 Entering
into treaties such as MLATs that facilitate cross-border law enforcement
and surveillance is one factor identified. In this work, we seek to further
the legal groundwork validating this hostility factor as a measure of a
country's jurisdictional risk to online privacy. To this end, we have built
the first comprehensive repository of MLATs. We have also built the first
database of MLAT metadata. We use this database to analyze the growth
in MLATs and their global interlocking cartels.
C. Threat, Advisory, and Attack Models
[172]
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LEA who wished to track the communications of a journalist who has
published leaked whistleblowing documents from a confidential sourcerevealing the Australian LEA's complicity in illegal narcotics activity. The
target journalist lives in New York and is a U.S. citizen. She opens her
laptop, goes online and fires up Tor. She communicates with her
whistleblowing source in Australia, who faces death if his identity is
uncovered-if he is de-anonymized. Her traffic passes through Tor relays
in China, Finland, and Malaysia, before proceeding to its final destination,
her source's chat server, also in Australia.
[173] We now demonstrate the attack model, the previously discussed
MLAT cartel attack. Australia has MLATs with China, Finland, Malaysia,
and many other countries. The CSPs and IXPs under their jurisdictions
have all long since been required to and have implemented ETSI TS 102
677, facilitating dynamic triggering of surveillance. 3 90 This process has
been administratively and technologically streamlined through the new,
"improved" MLAT Central Authority provisions.
[174] As before, the corrupt Australian LEA presses the button, targeting
the journalist's network traffic, hoping to find her source. Through traffic
correlation and timing attacks, the Australian LEA is able to capture the
journalist's outgoing message traffic on its way to the first Tor relay in
China. Timing and traffic correlation attacks reveal the destination of the
Tor middle relay in Finland, and the LEA captures that traffic as well. A
second time, the timing and traffic correlation attacks reveal the
destination of the Tor exit relay in Malaysia, and the LEA captures that
traffic as well. Finally, a third round of timing and traffic correlation
attacks reveal the targeted destination: the journalist's source. The corrupt
Australian LEA has just successfully captured the target journalist's
network traffic as it passes through Australia, China, Finland, Malaysia
and back to Australia.
[175] The content of the journalist's communication is unknown to the
corrupt Australian LEA until it leaves the exit relay, as Tor tunnels the
390
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traffic with encryption. However, once it leaves the exit relay, the LEA
can read the now unencrypted traffic, and see the identity of the target
whistleblower.
[176] Tor tears down and rebuilds new circuits every few minutes to
defeat attacks. Theoretically, a new circuit might be built through a noncartel partner, cutting off the surveillance. However, the main objective
has already been gained once a single circuit de-anonymizes the target.
Further, certain high-surveillance countries have expanded MLAT cartels,
such that the probability of achieving at least 50% full cartel circuits can
be high enough to capture significant information.
[177] This example illustrates the threat model of GIAs collaborating to
capture online communications through legal control of IXPs and CSPs
outside of their jurisdiction, via MLATs. And, the adversary model, a
cartel of collaborating GIAs using MLATs.
[178] In a refinement of the attack model, which we call the MLAT
"buddy" attack, the journalist still works at helping her source to blow
whistles. However, her Tor traffic path selection algorithm routes her
traffic communications through a country that does not collaborate with
the Australian LEAs, Iran. Nevertheless, Iran decides to record and store
the traffic on its own, as it has a high surveillance hostility factor. At a
future date, Iran can decide to supply the "missing link" of recorded traffic
and metadata that, together with information recorded by the cartel, can
piece together retroactively the whistleblower's identity. Thus, absolute
hostility to anonymous network traffic, measured in part by MLATs, is
relevant, even without factoring in cartel membership.
[179] In yet another attack model, the same corrupt Australian LEA
wishes to surveil traffic form the journalist target to her source
whistleblower, the ultimate target. This would be impermissible domestic
surveillance, However, by virtue of the traffic being randomly routed
outside the U.S. through Tor relays, it may classify it as non-domestic by
virtue of its application of Section 215 if FISA. As such, it may apply to
its MLAT partners for the traffic.
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D. Defenses Against MLAT attacks
[180] In Quantifying and Counteracting the Threat of Government
Intelligence Agencies Against Tor, we set forth how MJATs, like Tor, can
incorporate MLAT metrics into their path selection algorithm. This
enables MJATs to avoid countries with high hostility to anonymous
network traffic and high collaboration with surveillance cartel partners.
Every action to defeat privacy and anonymity, such as expansion of
MLATs, produces an equal and opposite reaction, such as improved
anonymous networks through path selection modifications to send
communications through countries less hostile to anonymous network
traffic.
VI. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE WORK

[181] MLATs have significantly expanded in recent years, in number
and in scope, with little public attention. We hope future MLAT research
will demonstrate that MLATs have indeed expanded the ability of LEAs
to solve crime, as the DOJ would assert. We have demonstrated that
MLATs have increased the risk of global surveillance, as well as eroded
civil liberties to a new, greater degree than has been identified in the past.
They have provided at least part of a framework to legalize mass
surveillance. They have facilitated imposing technical specifications for
surveillance capabilities on CSPs in MLAT cartel jurisdictions. They
provide a vector to measure hostility to privacy and anonymous
communications by country. Finally, they have facilitated complex
technical attacks against online anonymity- and privacy-protecting tools
(MJATs), such as Tor, that facilitate surveillance of domestic targets.
[182] We recommend reviewing MLATs comprehensively, rather than
on an ad hoc, country-by-country basis, including multilateral MLATs. As
the negative impact of MLATs on U.S. citizens and civil liberties becomes
clear, policymakers should consider modifications that enable law
enforcement to attain international cooperation and assistance, while
retaining civil liberties protections. In the meantime, online anonymity98
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and privacy-protecting tools can take country hostility factors such as
number of MLATs and other factors into account, as well as MLAT
cartels, and implement modified path selection algorithms. Thus, the catand mouse game will continue.
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